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ABSTRACT
Through motivated reasoning, citizens tend to process information in ways that confirm their prior
beliefs. This motivation is seen perhaps most clearly in how voters view the economy – citizens
identifying with the incumbent party view the economy favorably, while those opposed to the
incumbent party view the economy unfavorably. Thus, while all citizens exist within the same
national economy at a given point in time, they also display wide variations in how they perceive
that same economy. This study investigates the role the direction of partisan attachments, lev-
els of political knowledge, and the local economic environment play in the formation of national
economic perceptions. The findings show that, first, out-partisans are more prone towards moti-
vated reasoning than in-partisans when evaluating the national economy, both retrospectively and
prospectively. Second, the effect of in-party attachments on national economic perceptions be-
comes stronger with levels of political knowledge, but not for out-partisans. And third, changes
in economic performance at the county and state levels shape the effect of in-party identities on
economic perceptions, while out-party identities remain mostly isolated from the local economic
environment.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In 2008 the United States’ economy slipped into the worst recession since the 1930s. Politi-
cians and pundits debated the causes of and solutions to the financial crisis, a theme which res-
onated well into Barack Obama’s presidency. But the effects of the recession were not uniform
across the nation. For example, between November 2008 and November 2009 unemployment in
the state of Michigan increased by four and a half percentage points, reaching one of the highest
state unemployment rates in the nation. During that same time period, North Dakota’s unemploy-
ment rate rose by only half of a percentage point. Obviously many citizens in Michigan were hit
much harder by the recession than those in North Dakota. Even within states, economic perfor-
mance often varies rather dramatically across local communities. In the state of Texas between
2008 and 2009, net changes in local unemployment rates ranged from an 8.7 percentage point
increase in Morris County to a 0.3 percentage point decrease in King County.
How did these different local experiences shape how individual citizens perceived the na-
tional economy? Voters routinely view the economy in ways that satisfy their existing political
beliefs – those favoring the incumbent presidential party tend to view the economy more favorably
than those opposed to the incumbent party. But what role does the local context play in shaping
these partisan tendencies? Were in-partisans in Michigan during the Great Recession less likely
to view the economy favorably than in-partisans in North Dakota? Were out-partisans in King
County, Texas less likely to hold negative economic opinions than out-partisans in Morris County,
Texas?1 Moreover, is some threshold level of information necessary for partisans to efficiently
utilize party cues when evaluating the economy? Do levels of information also moderate the ten-
1Throughout this study, in-partisans are defined as individuals who identify with the party of the incumbent presi-
dent during each survey year; out-partisans are those opposed to the party of the incumbent president.
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dency for partisans to benchmark national economic evaluations on the performance of the local
economy? This dissertation is an investigation into how levels of political knowledge, in addition
to economic performance at the county and state levels, shape the process through which partisans
form perceptions of the national economy.
Most national economic indicators reflect the aggregation of often wildly varying local con-
ditions (Kramer 1983, Weatherford 1983). Thus, at any given point in time all voters face the same
national economic reality – yet voters routinely display wide variations in how they view the na-
tional economy. A long line of literature has shown that a wide range of non-economic factors can
explain some of this variation in national economic perceptions, such as media coverage (Goidel &
Langley 1995, Harrington 1989, Hetherington 1996), personal financial situations (Fiorina 1978,
Weinschenk 2010), demographic characteristics (Duch, Palmer & Anderson 2000), and, most im-
portantly, partisanship (Bartels 2002, Dettrey & Palmer 2013, Evans & Anderson 2006, Evans &
Pickup 2010, Wlezien, Franklin & Twiggs 1997). My focus here is on the latter. Three main ques-
tions are addressed by the following analyses. First, how does the direction of party identification
shape the motivated reasoning of partisans when evaluating the national economy? This question
hinges on psychological research that shows out-group identites to be more influential for opin-
ion formation than in-group identities (Ditto & Lopez 1992, Ditto et al. 1998, Goren, Federico &
Kittilson 2009). Second, how do partisans’ levels of political knowledge shape the motivation to
view the economy in belief-preserving ways? Political psychologists have shown that rather than
citizens becoming more policy-oriented with higher levels of knowledge, they actually become bet-
ter able to counter-argue facts which conflict with their prior beliefs (Taber & Lodge 2006, Taber,
Cann & Kucsova 2009, Lodge & Taber 2013). I expect this role of knowledge to apply also to how
partisans view the national economy – through a multiplicative interaction between party identi-
fication and political knowledge, the effects of partisanship should grow stronger with increasing
levels of knowledge. Finally, how does the local economic environment shape the tendency for
partisans to view the national economy in terms of their political identities? Moreover, how does
the moderating influence of the local economy on national economic perceptions vary with an
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individual’s level of knowledge? These latter questions are addressed in the bulk of the follow-
ing analyses and are explained in greater detail later in this chapter, as well as in their respective
substantive chapters.
The findings presented in this study raise important implications for the study of economic
voting and motivated reasoning. For decades scholars have debated whether voters have the ability
to evaluate economic performance in an unbiased manner and hold elected officials accountable,
or whether voters are restrained by the influence of partisanship and thus simply view the economy
in ways congruent with their prior political beliefs. Advocates of both camps routinely use their
arguments to make claims about the quality of democracy in the United States. If voters can
recognize poor economic performance when they see it and hold the incumbent party accountable,
then democracy is functioning well. If voters are never free from their partisanship and simply
paint subjective pictures of the economy that satisfy their personal beliefs, then democracy may be
in trouble. This dissertation demonstrates that scholars need to exercise much greater caution when
making normative assessments of democracy. A range of both individual and contextual factors
shape how citizens form opinions of the economy, and those opinion formation processes should
not be expected to remain constant across individuals or over time.
The first chapter of this study proceeds as follows. Section 1.1 reviews the existing litera-
ture on economic voting and motivated reasoning in the United States. Section 1.2 describes the
theoretical expectations that drive the following analyses, focusing first on the role that knowledge
can be expected to play in the motivated reasoning of partisans and second on the role that the local
economic environment can be expected to play for how partisans perceive the national economy.
Section 1.3 then briefly outlines the structure of the rest of this dissertation and briefly describes
the findings presented in each subsequent chapter.
1.1 Economic Voting in the United States
The relationship between politics and economics is a central component to gauging how
3
well democracy functions. By almost any definition of the word, ‘politics’ refers to a competition
over the distribution of power and resources. This distribution of resources – the economy – is one
of the most fundamental starting points for democratic accountability. Linking the economy to the
democratic governance is the economic voter. In an ideal world, voters punish incumbent govern-
ments for poor economic performance and reward them for good performance. But in reality, how
strong is that link? And how does the strength of that link change over time? Early research on eco-
nomic voting highlighted the influence of national economic performance on government approval
and election outcomes (Erikson 1989, Fair 1978, Fair 1988, Hibbs 1977, Kramer 1971, Lewis-
Beck 1988, Tufte 1978). Whether economic performance was measured in terms of national unem-
ployment, income, inflation, or national economic growth, these findings demonstrated seemingly
routine effects of economic performance on both the popularity and electoral success of incumbent
politicians and parties.
Despite the abundance of evidence of aggregate-level economic effects on election out-
comes and government approval, the literature has also produced a surprising number of contra-
dictory findings. For example, mass consumer sentiment tends to be shaped presidential approval
and media coverage of the economy than vice versa (De Boef & Kellstedt 2004). Other findings
have demonstrated evidence of a political business cycle in which political leaders strategically
manipulate economic policy in an effort to sway public opinion and maximize electoral success
(Nordhaus 1975, Tufte 1978)2. While the traditional model of aggregate-level economic voting
assumes a causal impact of economics on politics, these findings highlight an endogenous relation-
ship between the two. From a comparative perspective, contradictory findings on the relationship
between economic performance and election outcomes have been explained in terms of the strength
of party competition and the clarity of economic responsibility (Duch & Stevenson 2005, Duch &
Stevenson 2008, Nadeau, Niemi & Yoshinaka 2002, G. Bingham Powell & Whitten 1993, van der
Brug, van der Eijk & Franklin 2007, Whitten & Palmer 1999). The salience of economic issues has
also been shown to vary with the direction of economic performance, with the economy becoming
2But see also Sargent & Wallace (1975) and McCallum (1978).
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more important of an issue during times of economic crisis (Bloom & Price 1975, Stevenson 2002).
The implication of such economic asymmetries is that incumbent governments are more likely to
be punished for poor economic performance than they are to be rewarded for good economic per-
formance.
In an attempt to unravel these aggregate-level inconsistencies, scholars have also addressed
the economic vote at the individual-level. Theoretically, if economic performance is to have an
influence on election outcomes, it inherently must occur through the economic perceptions of in-
dividual voters. At any given point in time, voters exist within the same national economy – yet
scholars observe wide variations in how voters actually perceive national economic performance.
Some studies argue that the aggregation of individual perceptions do represent objective economic
performance, plus some idiosyncratic error (Converse 1990, Page & Shapiro 1992, Wittman 1989).
Other studies have explained individual-level heterogeneity in economic perceptions in terms of
political knowledge or sophistication (Bartels 1996, MacKuen, Erikson & Stimson 1992), media
coverage and exposure (Hetherington 1996, Iyengar et al. 1984), and personal financial situations
(Fiorina 1978). One of the most enduring debates among individual-level studies of economic vot-
ing has been the distinction between sociotropic versus pocketbook voting (Fiorina 1978, Fiorina
1981, Kiewiet 1983, Kinder & Kiewiet 1979, Kinder & Kiewiet 1981) – does the decision cal-
culus of the economic voter place more weight on evaluations of the national economy or one’s
own personal finances? Moreover, does the economic voter behave retrospectively, responding to
past economic performance, or prospectively, relying on rational expectations of future economic
performance? These two dimensions of economic voting (sociotropic/pocketbook and retrospec-
tive/prospective) have in large part been explained in terms of individual levels of political so-
phistication. More sophisticated voters are more likely to base their electoral decisions on future
expectations of their own personal finances, while less sophisticated voters respond more strongly
to retrospective evaluations of the national economy (Gomez & Wilson 2001, MacKuen, Erikson
& Stimson 1992). Even still, none of these findings go very far in explaining systematic variation
in individual-level evaluations of an aggregate-level constant: the national economy.
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As normatively appealing as the traditional conception of the economic voter is, its plau-
sibility is regularly called into question. From a psychological perspective, citizens tend to pro-
cess new information in ways that confirm their own prior beliefs (Kunda 1990, Lord, Ross &
Lepper 1979). Thus, through motivated reasoning, voters are more likely to view the economy
favorably when they identify with the incumbent political party. Democrats and Republicans in-
terpret the same economic facts in dramatically different ways (Bartels 2002), and citizens tend
to view the economy more favorably when identify with the party of the President (Evans &
Anderson 2006, Evans & Pickup 2010) or the majority party in Congress (Gerber & Huber 2010).
In particular, studies using longitudinal data have shown that apparent cross-sectional effects of
economic evaluations on political attitudes and behaviors have been drastically over-stated (Evans
& Pickup 2010, Wlezien, Franklin & Twiggs 1997).3 These findings suggest that economic percep-
tions are more likely a result of partisan rationalization than subjective responses to real changes
in the economy.
Such political biases in how citizens view the economy raise important implications for
democracy in the United States. For decades scholars have used the relationship between political
and economic attitudes to make broad, sweeping claims on the quality of democratic represrenta-
tion. On one hand voters evaluate the economy and update their political beliefs accordingly,
thus holding incumbent officials accountable for economic performance. In this case democracy
is functioning well. On the other hand, if voters simply view the economy through their parti-
san lense, then then democracy functions poorly. The primary purpose of this dissertation is to
show that the relationship between partisanship and economic perceptions, and therefore the qual-
ity of democracy in the United States, is not constant and should not be interpretted as a normative
signal about electoral accountability. Instead, I demonstrate in this study that this relationship be-
tween an individual’s partisan identity and how they evaluate economic performance depends on
the direction of the individual’s partisanship, the individual’s level of political knowledge, and the
performance of the local economy in which the partisan exists.
3For a defense of cross-sectional economic effects, see Lewis-Beck (2006) and Lewis-Beck, Martini & Kiewiet
(2013).
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1.2 A Theoretical Framework of National Economic Perceptions
This section describes the theoretical expectations that drive each of the following analy-
ses. These expectations are also described briefly in each respective substantive chapter. A theme
that echoes through this entire study is that in-partisans and out-partisans, defined in terms of the
incumbent presidential party, behave differently in terms of motivated reasoning. In a sort of cog-
nitive defense mechanism, out-group members tend to feel a stronger need to defend their prior
beliefs than in-group members. I expect these asymmetries to also apply to in-partisans and out-
partisans faced with evaluating the national economy. I expect, and go on to demonstrate, that
the moderating factors studied in the following analyses (political knowledge and local economic
performance) apply more strongly to in-partisans than out-partisans. Even as local economic con-
ditions improve or deteriorate, and regardless of levels of political knowledge, the effect of identi-
fying with the out-party should change very little. For in-partisans, on the other hand, the effect of
partisanship should be significantly different across levels of political knowledge and changes in
local economic performance.
1.2.1 Asymmetrical Influences of Political Knowledge
The first part of this study focuses on the role of political knowledge for the formation of
national economic perceptions. The role of political knowledge for public opinion in general has
been the subject of intense debate for decades. Much of this debate stems from scholarly disagree-
ment over how to properly measure knowledge and sophistication. It should be stated up front that
this study is not a measurement study – I construct a general measure of political knowledge from
American National Election Studies survey items which perform well on a single latent dimension.
My focus here is on how knowledge shapes the motivation for partisans to view the economy in
belief-preserving ways, not to make an argument about the appropriate operationalization of polit-
ical knowledge. As discussed later in Chapter 2, the knowledge item constructed in this analyses
7
performs similarly to simple educational attainment.
Based on findings which show that individual’s with higher levels of political knowledge
are more prone to motivated reasoning (Taber & Lodge 2006, Taber, Cann & Kucsova 2009, Lodge
& Taber 2013), I expect the effects of partisanship on economic perceptions to increase with levels
of political knowledge. Studies have shown that citizens holding the highest levels of information
tend to have the most stable opinions on political issues (Zaller 1992). Findings also show that the
effects of knowledge on economic evaluations are washed out when partisanship is controlled for
(Dettrey & Palmer 2013), but I expect this finding to be deceiving due to asymmetries between in-
partisans and out-partisans. In particular, most standard measures of party identification effectively
treat in-partisans and out-partisans as part of a single seven-point scale. In these analyses, I fold
partisanship into separate measures of party strength for in-partisans and out-partisans (with pure
independents treated as the baseline group). Doing so allows a model to capture different effect
sizes between the two partisan groups.4 Thus, an interactive effect of partisanship and knowledge
on economic perceptions should only apply to in-partisans, as the effects of out-party identities on
economic perceptions should be stronger than in-party identities. Similarly, the effects of political
knowledge on economic perceptions for in-partisans should increase with the strength of in-party
identities. The strongest evidence for partisan motivated reasoning should be observed for individ-
uals with strong attachments to the incumbent presidential party and the highest levels of political
knowledge.
1.2.2 Asymmetrical Influences of the Local Economic Environment
The analysis then moves to an investigation of how changes in local economic conditions
(measured at the county and state levels) moderate the effect of partisanship on national economic
perceptions. The local economy represents a middle ground between the national economy and
an individual’s own personal finances. Objective measures of national economic performance are
inadequate for explaining variation in subjective evaluations of the national economy, as such in-
4The measures of partisanship used here are described in greater detail in Chapter 2.
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dicators do not vary across individuals. On the other hand, changes in an individual’s personal
finances are also inadequate as they fail to capture the subjective homogeneity of individual within
a local context. Research has shown that citizens tend to form economic opinions similar to those
within their immediate surroundings (Ansolabehere, Meredith & Snowberg 2014). Voters are ex-
posed to economic signals from their local environment without necessarily possessing specific
knowledge about their community’s economic performance. An influence of local economic con-
ditions on economic opinions and voting behavior is not new, but evidence has thus far been sparse.
Indicators such as state-level unemployment rates (Books & Prysby 1999), local fuel prices, and
foreclosures (Reeves & Gimpel 2012) have been shown to impact how citizens evaluate the na-
tional economy. Local unemployment rates in the British context have also been linked to vote
choices in national elections (Johnston et al. 2000). However, none of these findings address the
asymmetrical influences of the local economy for in-partisans and out-partisans. Moreover, these
studies have tended to rely on static measures of economic performance, such as current levels of
unemployment. I expect that changes in economic performance are a more appropriate measure
of the local context than levels of performance at a given point in time. Thus, while preliminary
evidence has been established for a role of the local economy on national economic perceptions,
that evidence greatly needs to be expanded upon.
The theoretical mechanisms that should drive a moderating influence of the local econ-
omy can be found in the literature on political ambivalence, as well as the asymmetrical influ-
ences of positive and negative information on opinion formation. First, the literature on political
ambivalence argues that when partisans are exposed to conflicting political or economic signals,
confidence in partisanship as a heuristic for information processing is diminished (Basinger &
Lavine 2005, Delli Carpini, Cook & Jacobs 2004, Druckman & Nelson 2003, Lavine 1998, Lavine
2001, Lavine, Johnston & Steenbergen 2012, Mutz 2002). For example, a Republican voter lead-
ing up to the 2008 presidential election who disapproved of the Bush administration’s handling
of the economy was less likely rely on their partisanship when asked to evaluate the president’s
job performance, the performance of the national economy, or ultimate vote decision (Lavine,
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Johnston & Steenbergen 2012). Second, negative information has been shown to exert a stronger
influence on opinion formation than positive information (Baumeister et al. 2001, Hetherington
1996, Soroka 2006, Taylor 1991). The following example demonstrates how ambivalence and the
influence of negative information can combine to create a moderating effect of the local economy
for how partisans view the national economy. Consider four hypothetical voters: an in-partisan
in a prosperous local economy; an in-partisan in a deteriorating local economy; an out-partisan
in a prosperous local economy; and an out-partisan in a deteriorating local economy. First, the
in-partisan in a prosperous economy does not experience conflicting signals between the local en-
vironment and her partisanship. Thus, this first in-partisan remains confident in party cues when
asked to evaluate national economic performance. Second, the in-partisan in a deteriorating econ-
omy experiences conflicting signals between the partisan identity and information from the local
environment. She feels warmly toward the incumbent party, but negative signals from the lo-
cal environment reduce confidence in party cues when processing national economic information.
Thus, the effect of partisanship on national economic perceptions should be diminished. Third, the
out-partisan in a prosperous economy also experiences conflicting signals – an opposition to the
incumbent party combined with positive information from the local environment. However, since
this positive information is less influential for information processing than negative information,
and since out-partisans are more prone to motivated reasoning than in-partisans, this out-partisan
should retain a high degree of confidence in her partisanship when asked to evaluate the national
economy. Finally, the out-partisan in a deteriorating environment does not experience conflicting
signals and thus remains likely to view the national economy in terms of their partisanship.
1.3 Outline of the Study
Chapter 2 begins the analysis by investigating the ways in which political knowledge mod-
erates the motivated reasoning of partisans when evaluating the national economy. I develop a
unique measure of political knowledge based on a battery of survey items from the 1988 and
2012 American National Election Studies (ANES). I then model both retrospective and prospec-
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tive evaluations of the national economy as a function of partisanship, political knowledge, and an
interaction between the two, in addition to other individual characteristics that have been shown
to shape economic perceptions. The results show that the tendency to view the economy in a
belief-preserving manner increases with levels of political knowledge for in-partisans, but not for
out-partisans. Out-group members have been shown to be more prone towards motivated reasoning
than in-group members (Ditto & Lopez 1992, Ditto et al. 1998, Goren, Federico & Kittilson 2009),
and this tendency rings true throughout all of the following analyses. Citizens opposed to the in-
cumbent presidential party are about equally as likely to view the economy unfavorably across
the entire range of political knowledge. Those identifying with the incumbent party, on the other
hand, become more likely to view the economy favorably as levels of knowledge increase. Fi-
nally, these results only extend to the 2012 ANES – knowledge played no moderating rule for
the motivated reasoning of partisans during the 1988 survey. The most likely explanation for these
disparate findings are that as partisans have become more polarized over the past few decades, they
have simultaneously become more polarized in how the utilize partisan identities when processing
economic information.
Chapter 3 shifts its focus to the economic environment in which partisans exist. Using
data from the pooled ANES Time-Series studies from 1980-2012 supplemented with state-level
data on net changes in unemployment rates and per capita disposable income, I show that the
effect of in-party identities on national economic perceptions is significantly weaker in states with
rising unemployment than in states with declining unemployment. For out-partisans, the effect
of partisanship on economic perceptions does not change greatly with net changes in state-level
unemployment rates. Findings are relatively weaker for per capita disposable income. This is likely
due to the fact that income levels vary over time with inflation, as well as across the national with
the cost-of-living, suggesting that changes in unemployment rates are a more suitable measure for
the local economy than income levels. These findings apply to both retrospective and prospective
evaluations of the national economy.
Chapter 4 extends the previous chapter’s analysis by shifting the local economic environ-
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ment from the state-level to the county-level. While both state and county economic performance
represent a middle ground between the individual and the national economy,5 county-level perfor-
mance is likely to hit closer to an individual’s pocketbook than state-level performance. Data for
Chapter 4 come from the 2006-2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES), which
conveniently covers the time periods before, during, and after the Great Recession. The ANES
surveys do not include near the sample sizes within counties as the CCES surveys, but question
wordings between the two studies are almost identical. Chapter 4 uses the same measures of in-
party and out-party strength used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, and measures the local economy
in terms of twelve-month net changes in county-level unemployment rates. Income data were not
available for all counties, but this shouldn’t be problematic based on the null results for income in
Chapter 3. Chapter 4 then goes on to test three-way interactions between partisanship, county-level
economic performance, and political knowledge in order to estimate whether some sufficient level
of knowledge is needed in order for respondents to be influenced by changes in the local economy.
The results show non-significant changes for individuals with low, median, or high levels of knowl-
edge – the moderating influence of the local economy for the effect of partisanship on economic
perceptions is not conditional on levels of knowledge. This suggests one of two possibilities. First,
and most likely, signals from the local economic environment are stronger and thus wash out the
effect of political knowledge. Or second, the effects of knowledge wash out any effects of the local
environment. The former is more likely since these findings in Chapter 4 apply equally to both
in-partisans and out-partisans.
Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of the results and their implications for the study of
economic voting and the quality of democracy in the United States.
5The local economy has been referred to recently as the geotropic (Gimpel & Reeves 2012) or mecro-economy
(Ansolabehere, Meredith & Snowberg 2014).
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CHAPTER 2
POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE AND PARTISAN MOTIVATIONS IN NATIONAL ECONOMIC
PERCEPTIONS
In a representative democracy, the ideal citizenry observes objective policy-relevant facts
and translates that information into political beliefs – beliefs which aggregate to electoral account-
ability. These normative approaches to political reasoning describe a two-stage process in which
prior beliefs are first taken into account, and then new information is integrated to produce an up-
dated attitude or belief (Anderson 1981). However, the notion of an ideal Bayesian citizenry has
been challenged on multiple fronts. Citizens have been shown to face difficulty in distinguishing
between ideological positions on political issues (Converse 1964), and are generally uninformed
on even the most basic political facts (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). The general lack of political
knowledge in the American electorate doesn’t prevent citizens from still holding relatively stable
opinions. Partisan predispositions are routinely the strongest predictor of political attitudes and
behaviors (Campbell et al. 1960), sometimes questioning the ability of voters to correctly process
information in ways that hold elected officials accountable (Bartels 1996, Bartels 2002, Lau &
Redlawsk 2001). More generally, prior beliefs serve as anchors in the processing of new infor-
mation, motivating citizens to unevenly accept belief-confirming information while scrutinizing
belief-inconsistent information (Kunda 1990, Lord, Ross & Lepper 1979). One area of public
opinion in which motivated reasoning has been routinely demonstrated is economic voting – peo-
ple who identify with the incumbent political party tend to view the economy more favorably than
those opposed to the incumbent party, with little or no regard for objective economic performance
(Evans & Anderson 2006, Evans & Pickup 2010, Wlezien, Franklin & Twiggs 1997). This has
led to a debate among scholars as to whether voters are intellectually capable of holding elected
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officials accountable for economic performance. In order to better understand how economic and
political opinions relate to one another, the field needs to take a better account of the conditions
under which the processing of economic information is most likely to be biased by prior political
beliefs.
My goal in this chapter is to identify the conditions under which prior political beliefs are
the most likely to shape economic opinions. A better understanding of motivational biases in eco-
nomic perceptions will present a clearer picture of how voters respond to economic performance
and when they are most (or least) likely to hold incumbent officials accountable. I argue that levels
of political knowledge and the direction of party identification work together to shape the motivated
reasoning of partisans. First, citizens with higher levels of knowledge tend to be better equipped
to counterargue belief-inconsistent information than those with lower levels of knowledge (Taber
& Lodge 2006, Taber, Cann & Kucsova 2009, Lodge & Taber 2013). Second, out-group members
tend to be more sensitive to motivated reasoning than in-group members (Ditto et al. 1998, Goren,
Federico & Kittilson 2009). I expect that together these findings can help explain heterogeneity
in the economic perceptions of partisans. The impact of party signals on in-partisans’ economic
perceptions should grow stronger with levels of knowledge. Moreover, this conditional role of
knowledge should grow as in-party attachments grow stronger.1 Since members of the out-party
tend to be more strongly influenced by party cues, the perceptions of out-partisans should vary less
with knowledge than the perceptions of in-partisans.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.1 I review the liter-
ature on the relationship between political knowledge and motivated reasoning. In Section 2.2,
I describe my expectations for a moderating effect of knowledge and partisanship on motivated
reasoning in economic perceptions. In Section 2.3, I describe the data and methodological ap-
proaches used to test my theoretical expectations. The third section also devotes attention to the
operationalization of political knowledge, presenting an analysis of the underlying components of
political knowledge. Section 2.4 presents the results of ordered logit analyses which test the impact
1In this study, in-partisans (out-partisans) are defined as individuals who identify with (oppose) the party of the
incumbent president.
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of partisanship on economic perceptions for both in-partisans and out-partisans across the range of
political knowledge. Section 2.5 concludes with a discussion of the results and their implications
for the study of motivated reasoning and economic voting.
2.1 Knowledge, Partisanship, and Economic Perceptions
Citizens face both accuracy and directional goals when processing political information.2
Accuracy goals motivate citizens to objectively evaluate information in ways that lead to correct
conclusions (Baumeister & Newman 1994, Chaiken, Liberman & Eagly 1989, Fiske & Taylor
1991). When motivated by accuracy goals, voters objectively evaluate the economy and hold
elected officials accountable for economic performance. This is the central tenet of traditional mod-
els of economic voting, which view citizens as rational Bayesian actors who respond to economic
performance by updating their political preferences (Fiorina 1981, Key 1966, Kiewiet 1983, Lewis-
Beck 2006).3 Directional goals motivate citizens to process information in ways that confirm their
prior political beliefs (Ditto et al. 1998, Kruglanski & Webster 1996, Kunda 1990, Lord, Ross
& Lepper 1979). When driven by directional goals, voters view the economy positively when
they identify with the incumbent political party and negatively when they oppose the incumbent
party, regardless of objective economic performance. A growing consensus in the economic vot-
ing literature is that directional goals routinely influence how citizens process economic informa-
tion – in-partisans view the economy more favorably than out-partisans (Bartels 2002, Evans &
Anderson 2006, Evans & Pickup 2010, Gerber & Huber 2010, Wlezien, Franklin & Twiggs 1997).
These findings cast doubt on the ability of voters to evaluate economic performance independently
of their predisposed political beliefs (Anderson 2007).
The impact of prior political beliefs on economic opinions is supported by a long line of
psychological literature demonstrating an anchoring effect of prior beliefs on subsequent thought
2For more complete reviews of how individual goals and the information environment shape preference formation,
see Chaiken & Trope (1999), Druckman & Lupia (2000), and Lau (2003).
3A more in-depth review of the traditional economic voting literature can be found in Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier
(2000).
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processes (Kunda 1990, Lord, Ross & Lepper 1979, Westen et al. 2006). Generally termed moti-
vated reasoning, this tendency is described well in one of the early examinations of biased infor-
mation processing:
“...people tend to interpret subsequent evidence so as to maintain their initial be-
liefs. The biased assimilation processes underlying this effect may include a propen-
sity to remember the strengths of confirming evidence but the weaknesses of discon-
firming evidence, to judge confirming evidence as relevant and reliable but discon-
firming evidence as irrelevant and unreliable, and to accept confirming evidence at
face value while scrutinizing disconfirming evidence hypercritically.” (Lord, Ross &
Lepper 1979, pp. 2099)
At its core, Lord et al.’s argument was that people are motivated to accept facts that confirm their
prior beliefs while rejecting facts that contradict prior beliefs. In the decades since, an abun-
dance of observational (Federico 2005, Federico 2007, Federico & Schneider 2007) and exper-
imental evidence (Ditto et al. 1998, Erisen, Lodge & Taber 2014, Lodge & Taber 2013, Taber
& Lodge 2006, Taber, Cann & Kucsova 2009) for motivated reasoning has been produced. Cit-
izens are quicker to process and more accepting of preference-consistent facts (Lodge & Taber
2005, Redlawsk 2002, Taber & Lodge 2006, Taber, Cann & Kucsova 2009) and overly criticial of
preference-inconsistent facts (Ditto & Lopez 1992, Ditto et al. 1998). This tendency is reflected
in a negativity bias among out-partisans – individuals who oppose the incumbent political party
tend to be more sensitive to motivated reasoning than those who identify with the incumbent party
(Goren, Federico & Kittilson 2009). The implication for economic voting is that the economic per-
ceptions of out-partisans are likely to be more negatively biased than perceptions of in-partisans
are positively biased.
The strength and direction of prior preferences, as well as levels of knowledge have been
shown to moderate the influence of predispositions on information processing. First, the motiva-
tion to defend one’s prior beliefs depends on the simple fact that those beliefs do exist and are
strong enough to be worth defending. Without the presence of some strong prior preference, the
motivation to interpret information in self-confirming ways is greatly diminished. As prior beliefs
become stronger, so too does the motivation to defend them (Taber, Cann & Kucsova 2009, Westen
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et al. 2006). The moderating role of the strength and direction of prior beliefs has been demon-
strated on issues such as climate change (Jones & Song 2014, Kahan 2013, Kahan 2015), the death
penalty (Lord, Ross & Lepper 1979), affirmative action, and gun control (Taber & Lodge 2006).
In each case, individuals with the strongest prior policy preferences are the most skeptical of
preference-inconsistent arguments. Strong partisans have also tend to place more weight on di-
rectional goals than accuracy goals when evaluating political facts (Lodge & Taber 2000). Exper-
imental evidence also shows that the tendency for selective exposure grows with the strength of
prior beliefs (Brannon, Tagler & Eagly 2007).
Second, the direction of prior beliefs relative to new information moderates their influ-
ence on how new facts are evaluated. Voters are subject to both confirmation and disconfirma-
tion biases, generally accepting preference-consistent information while remaining skeptical of
preference-inconsistent information (Kruglanski & Webster 1996, Kunda 1990, Lord, Ross &
Lepper 1979). Yet experimental evidence shows that these biases are often asymmetrical, with
preference-inconsistent facts having a stronger influence on the decision-making process than
preference-consistent facts (Ditto & Lopez 1992, Ditto et al. 1998, Taber & Lodge 2006). The
implication is that citizens are unevenly accepting of information that confirms their prior beliefs
and skeptical of those that contradict prior beliefs. This results in a negativity bias among out-
partisans so that out-party cues exert a stronger motivation for defending one’s prior beliefs than
in-party cues (Goren, Federico & Kittilson 2009). For economic voting studies, this means that
out-partisans are more likely to view the economy unfavorably than in-partisans are to view the
economy favorably.
2.1.1 The Role of Knowledge in Political Reasoning
The mechanisms through which citizens evaluate economic performance are undoubtedly
far more complex than our current body of knowledge suggests, and this particular study is unlikely
to make such processes any simpler. However, it is important to note that most popular concep-
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tions of ‘economic voters’ and ‘motivated reasoners’ are inherently over-simplified. On one hand,
it is a somewhat naive assumption to claim that all citizens evaluate objective performance, update
their political attitudes, and then behave accordingly by punishing elected officials for bad perfor-
mance. On the other hand, it is perhaps overly pessimistic to claim that all partisans’ perceptions of
economic performance are biased by prior beliefs and attitudes. Milton Lodge and Charles Taber
describe the process through which citizens process information:
“...the human capacity for processing sensory experience is about 11 million bits per
second...The visual system takes up about 90 percent of this total capacity, processing
roughly 10 million bits of visual information per second. No more than 40 bits per
second of this visual information enters conscious working memory, so we become
aware of only 1/250,000 of what we see!” (Lodge & Taber 2013, pp. 2)
Obviously, behavior is unique to the human experience. My primary goal in this chapter is to take
findings from psychology on the role of information in opinion formation and apply them to the
motivated reasoning processes through which we know partisans often form economic judgments.
As economic voting scholars have increasingly concluded that partisan leanings shape
perceptions of economic performance, psychology research has established a range of factors
that condition the influence of prior preferences on information processing. Levels of knowl-
edge have been shown to moderate the influence of prior attitudes on political decision-making
(Zaller 1992), as well as the ability of citizens to actively counterargue belief-inconsistent facts
(Taber & Lodge 2006, Taber, Cann & Kucsova 2009). The precise mechanisms through which
knowledge moderates the influence of prior beliefs on subsequent reasoning processes has been a
source of disagreement. According to motivated reasoning, individuals tend to reject preference-
inconsistent information – yet the precise mechanisms through which knowledge moderates the
influence of prior beliefs on subsequent reasoning processes has been a source of disagreement.
On one hand, early research has argued that predisposed political biases tend to be strongest among
the least and most politically aware (Zaller 1992). According the Zaller’s argument, the least po-
litically aware tend to be less interested in politics, and therefore less likely to seek out additional
information when evaluating political objects. The most politically aware, on the other hand, tend
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to be the most interested in politics and hold the strongest and most stable political opinions. More
recent evidence also suggests that citizens with high levels of political knowledge tend to be bet-
ter able to actively counterargue belief-inconsistent information than less knowledgeable citizens
(Slothuus & de Vreese 2010, Sniderman, Tetlock & Brody 1991, Taber & Lodge 2006, Taber,
Cann & Kucsova 2009). The implication of these findings for how citizens view the economy is
that partisan biases in economic evaluations should grow stronger with levels of knowledge, but
that this tendency may not be symmetrical for in-partisans and out-partisans.
2.2 A Theory of Conditional Motivated Reasoning in Economic Perceptions
The theoretical expectations of this study are based on the notion that an individual’s ten-
dency towarded motivated reasoning is conditional upon her level of information and the strength
and direction of prior beliefs. I test the following two hypotheses using both retrospective and
prospective evaluations of the national economy. Since the relative weight placed on retrospective
and prospective evaluations has been shown to vary with information levels (MacKuen, Erikson
& Stimson 1992, Gomez & Wilson 2001), I test models of each for robustness. Pocketbook eval-
uations are of less interest from both a theoretical and a methodological perspective. The ANES
cross-sectional surveys do not provide an objective measure of changes in an individual’s personal
finances, making it difficult to distinguish between politically biased pocketbook evaluations (di-
rectional goals) and evaluations that reflect actual changes in an individual’s finances (accuracy
goals). All respondents exist within the same national economic context, making distinctions be-
tween directional and accuracy goals more clear with sociotropic evaluations. Moreover, a main
purpose of this study is to address heterogeneity in individual perceptions of a singular economy
– the national economy. Obviously, personal financial experiences vary across individuals. More
substantively interesting is understanding variation in how citizens view the same macroeconomic
reality.
My hypotheses are built on the following two premises: with knowledge comes a greater
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ability to recognize and reject preference-inconsistent information (Taber & Lodge 2006, Taber,
Cann & Kucsova 2009), and out-partisans are more sensitive to the motivation to confirm their
prior beliefs than in-partisans (Ditto et al. 1998, Goren, Federico & Kittilson 2009). First, I argue
that as levels of political knowledge increase, in-partisans become more likely to view the economy
in ways that confirm their prior political beliefs (i.e., favorably). Citizens with higher levels of
political knowledge and awareness tend to hold the most stable political opinions (Zaller 1992)
and tend to be the most sensitive to motivated reasoning (Taber & Lodge 2006, Taber, Cann &
Kucsova 2009). As they become more knowledgeable, in-party identifiers should become better
able to process economic information in ways that uphold their partisan identities. Thus, the most
knowledgeable in-partisans should be best equipped to accept information that confirms their prior
attitudes while rejecting information that contradicts those attitudes. As such, partisanship should
serve as a stronger anchor for the formation of economic perceptions for in-partisans with high
levels of knowledge than in-partisans with low levels of knowledge. This should especially ring
true for those with the strongest in-partisan attachments. My first hypothesis states that:
H1: In-partisans with strong partisan attachments and high levels of knowledge should
be more likely to view the economy favorably than in-partisans with weaker partisan
attachments and low levels of knowledge.
Second, since out-group members are more sensitive to motivated reasoning than in-group
members (Ditto et al. 1998, Goren, Federico & Kittilson 2009), I don’t expect political knowl-
edge to matter as much for out-partisans. Identification with the out-party leads to a cognitive
defense mechanism that should override any influence of political knowledge. The subjective need
to defend one’s beliefs is inherently stronger for individuals who identify with an outside group
– members of an in-group are already the ‘winners’, and therefore feel less pressure to defend
their position. As such, out-partisans with either low or high levels of knowledge should be about
equally as likely to view the economy in self-confirming ways (i.e., unfavorably). Any remain-
ing influence of knowledge should be diminished as the strength of out-party attachments grows
stronger. My second hypothesis states that:
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H2: Political knowledge should play less of a moderating role for how out-partisans
view the economy, especially for those with the strongest out-party attachments.
If these hypotheses hold true, two observations should become clear when examining
the relationship between partisanship, political knowledge, and economic perceptions. For in-
partisans, the effect of partisanship on economic perceptions should grow stronger with both the
strength of partisanship and levels of political knowledge. For out-partisans, the effect of partisan-
ship on economic perceptions should remain mostly stable regardless of partisan strength or levels
of political knowledge. These findings will raise important implications for our understanding of
partisan biases in economic perception and, more broadly, the origins of public opinion. Scholars
have proposed a wide range of theories regarding the mechanisms through which citizens form
economic opinions – my general expectation is that those mechanisms are not static across indi-
viduals. In order to better understand when economic judgments are most likely to reflect partisan
biases – and conversely, when economic judgments are most likely to shape partisan identities –
we need to take a better account of individual differences in prior attitudes and information levels.
2.3 Data and Methods
Data for the following analyses come from the 1988 and 2012 American National Election
Studies (ANES). These two particular surveys each contain a wide range of items that gauge an
individual’s level of political knowledge. While several other ANES surveys also include various
knowledge items, the 1988 and 2012 surveys contain many of the same items. The two surveys
were also conducted in years with different incumbent presidential parties, eliminating the possi-
bility that variation in motivated reasoning might stem from differences between Democratic and
Republican identifiers rather than in-partisans and out-partisans. If the latter is true, then the two
survey years should show similar results even despite one year having a Republican president and
the other having a Democratic president. The two years also represent different points along the
timeline of party polarization in the electorate. Between the two surveys, three important trends
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have occurred. First, political elites have become increasingly polarized across party lines. This
polarization has been reflected in the content of media coverage, particularly when it comes to
issues as important as the economy. Second, with the internet boom citizens have become better
able to self-select into networks that reflect their prior beliefs. Third, and most importantly for
this study, these latter two trends have resulted in greater polarization within the electorate. Thus,
the 2012 ANES survey reflects the opinions of a very different electorate than that from the 1988
survey. An analysis of both years allows for the possibility that the moderating influence of knowl-
edge on the motivated reasoning of partisans might have changed with the polarization of the party
in the electorate.
The dependent variables in the following analyses are retrospective and prospective evalu-
ations of the national economy.4 For the retrospective item, respondents were asked whether the
national economy had gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed about the same over the past year. A
follow-up question then asked whether conditions had become much better (worse) or only some-
what better (worse), resulting in a five-point scale ranging from “much worse” to “much better”.
For the prospective item, respondents were asked whether they expect the national economy to get
better, worse, or stay about the same during the next year. No follow-up question was included for
the prospective item, resulting in a three-point scale coded as “worse”, “the same”, and “better”.
The primary indendendent variabes included measures of both in-partisan and out-partisan
strength, as well as political knowledge. The two measures of partisan strength consist of a trans-
formation of the traditional ANES seven-point scale which ranges from strong Republicans to
strong Democratics. In-partisan strength is an ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 3, with indepen-
dent leaning in-partisans coded as 1, weak in-partisans coded as 2, strong in-partisans coded as
3, and all out-partisans and pure independents coded as 0. Out-partisan strength is measured the
same way for respondents indentifying with the opposition party.5 These two measures of par-
4All variable codings, question wordings, and descriptive statistics can be found in the Appendix for this chapter.
5For the purposes of this study, the distinction between in-partisans and out-partisans is based on the party of
the incumbent president. For the 1988 ANES, Democratic identifiers are considered out-partisans and Republican
identifiers are considered in-partisans. For the 2012 ANES, Republican identifiers are considered out-partisans and
Democratic identifiers are considered in-partisans.
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tisanship are better able to capture the potential for asymmetrical relationships between political
and economic opinions for in-partisans and out-partisans. By including both the in-partisan and
out-partisan measures in the same model, pure independents are effectively treated as the base-
line group. Applied within the contexts of the 1988 and 2012 ANES studies, these two measures
also distinguish fundamental differences between Democratic and Republican identifiers from dif-
ferences between in-group and out-group members. Other control variables include presidential
approval, ideological self-placement, employment status, race, gender, and age.
In order to test how economic perceptions are conditional on political knowledge and the
strength and direction of partisanship, I apply ordered logit models to test an interaction between
the measures of partisanship described above and the measures of political knowledge that are de-
scribed in the following section. Predicted probabilities for each response to the economic percep-
tion items (worse, the same, better) are then simulated for each value of partisanship and political
knowledge in order to examine how the probabilities of giving certain evaluations of the national
economy move along with changes in political knowledge and direction of partisanship.
2.4 Measuring Political Knowledge
One of the most important aspects for studying the quality of represenative democracy
is understanding citizens’ knowledge of political matters. If elected officials are to be held ac-
countable for their performance in office, then some basic understanding of political matters is
required of voters. Unfortunately, a wide range of research has demonstrated a lack of knowledge
on such matters. The American electorate has been shown repeatedly to not think in ideolog-
ical terms (Converse 1964), to possess minimal knowledge of political matters (Delli Carpini &
Keeter 1996), and to show very little interest in public affairs (Putnam 2001). However, the public’s
overall level of political information and interest in public affairs is not the focus of this chapter.
Obviously, some degree of variation in political knowledge exists across individuals. My interest is
in how these different levels of information shape the tendency for partisans to view the economy
in belief-preserving (and often biased) ways.
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Another issue in the study of political knowledge lies in its measurement. The political
cognitions that citizens possess have been measured in terms of correlations between policy at-
titudes (Campbell et al. 1960, Converse 1964), awareness of basic political facts (Delli Carpini
& Keeter 1996, Zaller 1986), and simple educational attainment. I do not make a claim here for
which measurement approach is most appropriate. Instead, the measure of knowledge used here
is comprised of a wide range of survey items that probe different areas of political expertise. Both
the 1988 and the 2012 ANES surveys include questions that gauge citizens’ knowledge of various
political offices, political and social issues, and factual information about how the American politi-
cal system functions. I use a weighted sum of each of these survey items to create a latent measure
of general political knowledge.
To measure citizens’ recognition of various political offices, the 1988 ANES survey asked
respondents to identify the political offices held by Jim Wright, Margaret Thatcher, Mikhail Gor-
bachev, George Schultz, Ted Kennedy, and Yasser Arafat. The 2012 ANES survey asked respon-
dents to identify the political offices held by John Boehner, Joe Biden, David Cameron, Timothy
Geitner, and Ban Ki-moon.6 For all of these items except the 2012 Treasury Secretary and Sec-
retary General of the UN, respondents were read the name of the political figure and asked to
open-endedly identify their respective office. For the Treasury Secretary and the Secretary General
of the UN items, respondents were asked to select from a list of four political figures who held each
office. These latter two items were included in the 2012 ANES survey as supplemental material
from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). The 1988 ANES survey similarly asked
respondents to identify the political offices held by Jim Wright (Speaker of the House), George
Schultz (Secretary of State), Ted Kennedy (U.S Senator), Yasser Arafat (Russian leader), Margaret
Thatcher (Prime Minister of Great Britain), and Mikhail Gorbechev (Russian leader). Incorrect
responses were coded as zero and correct responses were coded as one. In the analysis presented
here, “don’t know’s” were coded as incorrect resopnses (Mondak 1999, Mondak 2001, Mondak &
6Respondents were also asked in both surveys to identify the office of the Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, but this item was excluded due to coding issues following the survey; a detailed description of those
complications can be found at http://electionstudies.org/announce/newsltr/20080324PoliticalKnowledgeMemo.pdf.
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Davis 2001).
To measure knowledge of political issues, both surveys asked respondents to place the
Democratic and Republican parties and their respective presidential candidates on seven-point
Likert-type ideological and issue scales. In addition to the traditional seven-point liberal-conservative
scales (coded as one for extremely liberal to seven for extremely conservative), issue placement
items included the government’s role in the following issues: government services, defense spend-
ing, health care, job guarantees, aid to minorities, and environmental regulations.7 For each of
these issues except aid to minorities and environmental regulations, respondents were given a list
of seven positions ranging from high government involvement to no government involvement and
asked to place the two parties and their presidential candidates on the scale. For the aid to minori-
ties and environmental regulations items, respondents were only asked to place the candidates on
the issue scales. Responses were coded as correct if the Democratic Party (candidate) was placed
correctly relative to the Republican Party (candidate). For example, on the item that asked respon-
dents to place the two parties on the seven-point ideology scale, responses were counted correct if
the Democratic Party was considered more liberal than the Republican Party. These twelve items
were also coded as zero for incorrect responses and one for correct responses, with “don’t know’s”
coded as incorrect.
To measure factual knowledge, the 1988 survey asked several questions targeting respon-
dents’ knowledge of specific political and economic facts. The items included in this study consist
of three questions asking respondents whether the national unemployment rate, inflation, and the
size of the deficit had gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed the same since 1980. Another question
asked respondents whether the Democratic or Republican Party was more conservative. The final
two questions asked respondents which party controlled the House and the Senate prior to the 1988
elections. The 2012 survey asked respondents a battery of ten questions targeting specific political
and economic facts. Respondents were asked how the national unemployment rate had changed
7To be specific, the 1988 ANES included each of these issue scales for both parties and candidates, with the
exception of environmental regulations. The 2012 ANES did not include the aid to minorities and environmental
regulations items for the two parties, but did for the presidential candidates.
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during the past year, what the current unemployment rate was, how the federal deficit had changed
since the 1990s, the number of years in a single Senate term, the number of terms a president can
serve, where to vote, which program the federal government spends the least amount of money on,
what medicare is, which is the more conservative of the two major parties, and which party was
the minority in the House following the 2012 elections. Each factual item was coded as zero for
incorrect or “don’t know” and one for correct responses.
At this point a general measure of political knowledge was constructed as a weighted sum-
mated rating scale of each of the items described above.8 The usefulness of such indices has been
a subject of debate, and important assumptions need to be established in its defense. The overall
index of political knowledge used in this study can be written as:
Xi =
1
k
k
∑
j=1
Vj (2.1)
where Xi is an individual i’s score on the knowledge index andVj is one of k survey items included
in the index. The goal is for Xi to represent an individual’s “true” level of political knowledge,
which is unobservable. Since each of k survey items is being used to construct an estimate of an
unobserved dimension, it is assumed that each Vj survey item represents a measure of the true
underlying dimension plus some degree of error, or:
Vj = T + ε j (2.2)
Under the assumption that ε j is random, E(ε) = 0, and ε j is uncorrelated with the true dimension
T , then the variance of the errors approaches zero as k increases:
8An exploratory factor analysis was conducted to test how well each of the above survey items load onto a single
latent measure of general political knowledge. Based on the results of the factor analysis, the 2012 ANES item asking
respondents whether the national unemployment rate had gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed about the same during
the past year had a factor loading of only 0.11 and a uniqueness of 0.99, and was thus dropped from the overall
measure. All other items in the 2012 survey had a factor loading of 0.25 or higher and were retained in the weighted
scale. The remaining twenty six items from the 2012 survey accounted for just over 65% of the total variance in the
latent measure of political knowledge and had an alpha coefficient of 0.88. For the 1988 survey, all twenty four items
had a factor loading of 0.30 or higher and were retained in the weighted scale. These items accounted for about 64%
of the total variance in the latent measure of knowledge and had an alpha coefficient of 0.89. The factor loadings for
each survey can be found in the appendix to this chapter.
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Var(ε¯) =
r2ε
k
(2.3)
This measure is very similar to that described by Zaller (1986) in his analysis of twenty-
seven knowledge items contained in the 1985 ANES Pilot Study. To beter illustrate the reliability
of this measure of political knowledge, Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 show the correlations of each com-
ponent item with the overall index for the 1988 and 2012 ANES, respectively. All coefficients are
positive and are statistically significant from zero. While some scholars advocate some minimum
correlation threshold for including an item as part of an index, I chose to keep all items based on
the results from the exploratory factor analysis shown in the appendix to this chapter. Correlations
that are lower in magnitude might simply tap into a different area of knowledge than other items.
Nonetheless, as long as all items are positive, the resulting measure is a reliable representation of
“true” levels of political knowledge.
The distribution of political knowledge for both survey years is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
In the 1988 ANES, the overall measure of political knowledge had a mean of 0.48 and a standard
deviation of 0.28; the 2012 ANES had a mean of 0.65 and a standard deviation of 0.23. Recoding
“don’t know” responses as missing values did not substantially change the distribution in either
survey, so such responses were left coded as incorrect for the sake of preserving sample size. Based
on the abundance of evidence suggesting low levels of knowledge among American voters, the
relatively high level of knowledge in the 2012 survey is somewhat surprising. One explanation is
that I have been more lenient in how correct and incorrect responses were coded on the ideological
knowledge items. While previous research has required a certain amount of distance between the
left-right placement of the two major parties and candidates (Zaller 1992), I have coded responses
as correct as long as the Republican Party (candidate) was placed at least one category to the
right of the Democratic Party (candidate). An important issue with any Likert-type scaling is that
there is no “true” distance between any two points. The distance between two points on a 7-
point ideology scale, for example, might mean one thing for one respondent and mean something
entirely different for another respondent. Thus, while the ideological distance between political
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Table 2.1. Item-Total Correlations, 1988 ANES
General Knowledge
Speaker 0.44
UK Prime Minister 0.57
Arafat 0.59
Russian Prime Minister 0.58
Secretary of State 0.58
Ted Kennedy 0.53
Party Ideology 0.68
Party Gov’t Services 0.62
Party Defense Spending 0.64
Party Healthcare 0.67
Party Job Guarantees 0.66
Party Minority Aid 0.42
Candidate Ideology 0.66
Candidate Gov’t Services 0.63
Candidate Defense Spending 0.66
Candidate Healthcare 0.61
Candidate Job Guarantees 0.65
Candidate Minority Aid 0.42
∆Unemployment 0.40
∆Inflation 0.52
∆Deficit 0.42
More Conservative Party 0.46
Senate Party 0.57
House Party 0.61
Note: Entries are pairwise correlation coefficients.
figures undoubtedly varies, Likert scales fail to capture variation in how respondents interpret
those ideological distances. For a researcher to set some minimum distance to be deemed a correct
response effectively minimizes the observed “knowledge” of a set of respondents. For this reason,
I have coded responses as correct as long as the Democratic figure was placed to the left of the
Republican figure with the implication that knowledge has a more negatively skewed distribution
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Table 2.2. Item-Total Correlations, 2012 ANES
General Knowledge
Speaker of the House 0.57
Vice President 0.50
UK Prime Minister 0.46
Treasury Secretary 0.60
UN Secretary General 0.42
Party ideology 0.63
Party gov’t services 0.59
Party defense spending 0.62
Party healthcare 0.65
Party job guarantees 0.64
Candidate ideology 0.60
Candidate gov’t services 0.53
Candidate defense spending 0.61
Candidate healthcare 0.60
Candidate job guarantees 0.60
Candidate aid to minorities 0.52
Candidate environment 0.58
Current unemployment 0.44
Where to vote 0.37
Presidential terms 0.34
Senate terms 0.48
More conservative party 0.51
House election outcome 0.48
Size of deficit 0.45
What is medicare? 0.34
Federal spending 0.32
Note: Entries are pairwise correlation coefficients.
than presented in many previous studies.9
2.5 Analysis
To test the hypotheses described above, I estimate ordered logit models of economic per-
ceptions as a function of partisanship, political knowledge, and other exogenous control variables.
In order to test the influence of knowledge for the relationship between partisanship and economic
9This should not be interpreted as American voters being more knowledgeable about politics than previously
thought, but simply a different perspective on how knowledge is measured.
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Figure 2.1. Kernel Density Plot of General Political Knowledge, 1988 and 2012 ANES
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perceptions, I include an interaction between knowledge and both in-partisan and out-partisan
strength. Table 2.3 shows the results for both retrospective and prospective evaluations of the na-
tional economy during each survey year. Looking at the logit estimates, the 1988 results seem
starkly different from the 2012 results. For both the 1988 retrospective and prospective models,
neither interaction term is statistically different from zero, suggesting that the relationship between
partisanship and economic perceptions did not change significantly with levels of political knowl-
edge during the 1988 ANES. The 2012 models present better evidence of a relationship between
partisanship and economic perceptions that may be conditional on levels of political knowledge.
However, the coefficients for interaction terms and their component items should be interpretted
with caution, as they measure conditional relationships. More substantively interesting is the ex-
tent to which the probability of a particular outcome changes with political knowledge and the
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Table 2.3. Ordered Logit Estimates of the Conditional Effects of Partisanship and Knowledge on
Economic Perceptions
Retrospective Prospective
1988 2012 1988 2012
In-party strength 0.127 −0.302∗∗∗ 0.236 −0.040
(0.162) (0.090) (0.166) (0.090)
Out-party strength 0.153 0.379∗∗∗ 0.316∗ 0.354∗∗
(0.143) (0.117) (0.151) (0.112)
Political knowledge 0.669 1.516∗∗∗ −0.419 0.954∗∗∗
(0.484) (0.262) (0.490) (0.253)
In-party*Knowledge 0.087 0.557∗∗∗ −0.005 0.513∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.134) (0.255) (0.135)
Out-party*Knowledge −0.347 −0.627∗∗∗ −0.273 −0.217
(0.243) (0.161) (0.255) (0.154)
Education 0.045 0.124∗∗∗ 0.030 0.028
(0.038) (0.021) (0.038) (0.021)
Presidential approval 0.514∗∗∗ 1.057∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.038) (0.060) (0.036)
Ideological self-placement −0.066 −0.100∗∗∗ 0.026 0.021
(0.046) (0.027) (0.47) (0.028)
Employment status 0.001 −0.572∗∗∗ −0.152 −0.086
(0.284) (0.116) (0.302) (0.116)
Nonwhite 0.214 −0.127 0.357∗ 0.247∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.068) (0.178) (0.069)
Female −0.459∗∗∗ −0.279∗∗∗ −0.110 −0.112
(0.115) (0.059) (0.116) (0.059)
Age −0.004 −0.002 0.004 −0.0002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
1|2 0.462 2.429∗∗∗ −0.219 0.994∗∗∗
(0.404) (0.250) (0.412) (0.242)
2|3 2.886∗∗∗ 4.644∗∗∗ 2.318∗∗∗ 3.448∗∗∗
(0.414) (0.259) (0.419) (0.248)
Observations 1,302 5,072 1,255 5,002
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.245 0.021 0.145
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
strength and direction of partisanship.
2.5.1 2012 Results
Figure 2.2 plots changes in the predicted probability of holding a favorable retrospective
economic perception during the 2012 ANES study based on changes in political knowledge from
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Figure 2.2. Change in Probability of Favorable Retrospective Economic Percpetions based on
Changes in Knowledge from the 5th to the 95th Percentile, 2012 ANES
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Favorable Retrospective Evaluations, 2012 ANES
Notes: First-differences indicate the change in the predicted probability of holding a favorable economic perception
based on a change from the 5th to the 95th percentiles of political knowledge; vertical bars indicate the upper and
lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval.
the 5th to the 95th percentile. More intuitively, the point estimates shown in the figure represent
how much more likely a partisan with high levels of knowledge is to view the economy favorably
than a similar partisan with low levels of knowledge. Vertical bars surrounding the point estimates
indicate the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval.10 The left panel represents
in-partisans and the right panel represents out-partisans, with the strength of partisan identities
specified on the x-axis of each panel. The results shown in the figure offer support for a positive
relationship between levels of political knowledge and the tendency for in-partisans to view the
economy in accordance with their prior political beliefs. As the baseline group, pure independents
10First-differences were simulated from the ordered logit models in Table 2.3 using the Clarify postestimation suite
(King, Tomz & Wittenberg 2000, Tomz, Wittenberg & King 2003).
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with high levels of political knowledge were almost 20% more likely to view the favorably than
indpendents with the lowest levels of knowledge. As partisan identities shift towards the party
of the incumbent president, this difference across political knowledge grows in magnitude. High-
knowledge in-partisan leaners were about 25% more likely to view the economy favorably than
low-knowledge in-partisan leaners; high-knowledge weak in-partisans just over 30% more likely
than low-knowledge weak in-partisans; and high-knowledge strong in-partisans about 40% more
likely than low-knowledge strong in-partisans. These results present strong initial evidence of a
conditional influence of political knowledge on the motivated reasoning of in-partisans.
Turning to the right panel of Figure 2.2, the results suggest a slightly weaker influence of
political knowledge on the tendency for out-partisans to view the economy in belief-preserving
ways. Based on conventional wisdom, we can expect out-partisans to be less likely to view the
economy favorably than in-partisans. I have hypothesized that while knowledge moderates the mo-
tivated reasoning of in-partisans, out-partisans will be more sensitive to motivated reasoning pro-
cesses regardless of political knowledge. This first set of results does indeed point to a weaker in-
fluence of knowledge for the economic perceptions of out-partisans – high-knowledge out-partisan
leaners were actually about 10% more likely to view the economy favorably than low-knowledge
out-partisan leaners. Once the strength of out-party identities shifts beyond the “leaners” category,
the difference in economic perceptions between high- and low-knowledge out-partisans becomes
indistinguishable from zero.
Figure 2.3 similarly plots changes in the predicted probability of holding a favorable prospec-
tive economic perception based on 5th to 95th percentile changes in knowledge, also during the
2012 ANES study. The results look very similar to those for the retrospective model – as levels of
knowledge increase, in-partisans become more likely to view the economy favorably. Moreover, as
the strength of identification with the incumbent party increases, so too does the tendency for more
knowledgeable in-partisans to view the economy favorably than their less knowledgeable counter-
parts. Once again, these results are much weaker for out-partisans, with very little difference in
the probability of high- and low-knowledge out-partisan leaners having favorably prospective eco-
33
Figure 2.3. Change in Probability of Favorable Prospective Economic Percpetions based on
Changes in Knowledge from the 5th to the 95th Percentile, 2012 ANES
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Notes: First-differences indicate the change in the predicted probability of holding a favorable economic perception
based on a change from the 5th to the 95th percentiles of political knowledge; vertical bars indicate the upper and
lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval.
nomic judgments. Weak and strong out-partisans displayed no significant difference in prospective
evaluations with changes in levels of political knowledge.
While Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 reveal interesting results regarding favorable economic
judgments, it is also useful to examine the probability of partisans holding unfavorable judgments.
While motivated reasoning processes should lead in-partisans to be more likely to view the econ-
omy favorably than out-partisans, they should similarly lead out-partisans to be more likely to view
the economy unfavorably than in-partisans. Figure 2.4 plots the first-difference effects of changes
political knowledge from the 5th to the 95th percentile on this tendency for out-partisans to view
the economy less favorably than in-partisans during the 2012 ANES study. The results shown in
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Figure 2.4. Change in Probability of Unfavorable Retrospective Economic Percpetions based on
Changes in Knowledge from the 5th to the 95th Percentile, 2012 ANES
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Unfavorable Retrospective Evaluations, 2012 ANES
Notes: First-differences indicate the change in the predicted probability of holding an unfavorable economic
perception based on a change from the 5th to the 95th percentiles of political knowledge; vertical bars indicate the
upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval.
the figure echo those shown in Figure 2.2 – high-knowledge in-partisans are less likely to view
the economy unfavorably than low-knowledge in-partisans, and this trend is magnified with in-
creases in the strength of in-party attachments. Once again, knowledge has only a weak impact on
the economic perceptions of out-partisan leaners with no statistically significant influence on the
perceptions of weak and strong out-partisans.
Finally, Figure 2.5 plots the first-difference effects of political knowledge on the probability
of partisans holding an unfavorably prospective economic perception. The results shown here stand
in contrast to the results presented thus far. In the case of unfavorable prospective evaluations,
political knowledge seems to play very little role for either in-partisans or out-partisans. Looking
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Figure 2.5. Change in Probability of Unfavorable Prospective Economic Percpetions based on
Changes in Knowledge from the 5th to the 95th Percentile, 2012 ANES
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Notes: First-differences indicate the change in the predicted probability of holding an unfavorable economic
perception based on a change from the 5th to the 95th percentiles of political knowledge; vertical bars indicate the
upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval.
first at in-partisans, high-knowledge partisans were roughly 10% less likely to give an unfavorably
prospective evaluation than low-knowledge partisans, and this tendency remained fairly constant
across the strength of in-partisan identities. Similarly, knowledge also played very little role for
the probability of out-partisans giving an unfavorable prospective evaluation. High-knowledge out-
partisan leaners were about 5% less likely to view the economy unfavorably than low-knowledge
out-partisan leaners, while knowledge played no significant role in the perceptions of weak or
strong out-partisans.
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2.5.2 1988 Results
Up to this point, the 2012 ANES survey data lend support to the hypothesis that polit-
ical knowledge moderates the motivated reasoning of in-partisans when evaluating the national
economy, but less so for out-partisans. However, the 1988 results paint a very different picture.
Figure 2.6 through Figure 2.9 plot the same first-difference effects of knowledge as the previous
four figures, this time using data from the 1988 ANES study. Looking first at favorably retro-
spective evaluations shown in Figure 2.6, there is no significant difference in the probability of ei-
ther high-knowledge in-partisans or out-partisans viewing the economy more favorably than their
low-knowledge counterparts. Moreover, these null findings are consistent across the strength of
partisanship for both in-partisans and out-partisans. This suggests that the amount of political or
economic information held by partisans during the late 1980s played very little role in the moti-
vated reasoning processes that shape economic opinions.
The results shown in Figure 2.7 for favorable prospective evaluations are substantively the
same as those shown in Figure 2.6. Regardless of the direction of partisanship, there was no
distinguishable difference between the probability of high- and low-knowledge partisans giving a
favorable prospective evaluation of the national economy.
Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9 plot the first-difference effects of political knowledge on the
probability of partisans holding unfavorable retrospective and prospective economic evaluations,
respectively. Once again, neither figure offers results that substantively differ from those shown in
the previous two figures. Even when looking at differences in the probability viewing the economy
unfavorably based on changes in political knowledge, neither in-partisans nor out-partisans display
significant results.
Explaining the null findings found in the 1988 ANES data presents an interesting take on
how the motivated reasoning of partisans has changed over time. As political elites have become
more ideologically polarized over the past few decades and advances in communication technology
have allowed citizens to more easily self-select into information networks that confirm their prior
37
Figure 2.6. Change in Probability of Favorable Retrospective Economic Percpetions based on
Changes in Knowledge from the 5th to the 95th Percentile, 1988 ANES
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Favorable Retrospective Evaluations, 1988 ANES
Notes: First-differences indicate the change in the predicted probability of holding a favorable economic perception
based on a change from the 5th to the 95th percentiles of political knowledge; vertical bars indicate the upper and
lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval.
beliefs, partisans have become more ideologically attached to their partisan identities. A likely
explanation for the different findings between the 1988 ANES and the 2012 ANES is that this
polarization in the electorate has changed the mechanisms through which partisans process and
subsequently either accept or reject economic information. As partisans have become more ideo-
logically polarized, higher levels of political knowledge have become more useful for interpretting
economic facts in belief-preserving ways, especially for in-partisans. That is, highly knowledge-
able in-partisans have become more likely to not only make economic judgments that reflect their
prior attitudes, but they have also become better able to actively counterargue economic informa-
tion that rejects those beliefs. This result echoes other findings on the role of knowledge for opin-
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Figure 2.7. Change in Probability of Favorable Prospective Economic Percpetions based on
Changes in Knowledge from the 5th to the 95th Percentile, 1988 ANES
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Favorable Prospective Evaluations, 1988 ANES
Notes: First-differences indicate the change in the predicted probability of holding an unfavorable economic
perception based on a change from the 5th to the 95th percentiles of political knowledge; vertical bars indicate the
upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval.
ion formation (Taber & Lodge 2006, Taber, Cann & Kucsova 2009, Zaller 1992). The ultimate
implication of the findings presented here is that the importance of information in the motivated
reasoning of partisans has increased dramatically since the 1980s.
While the role of knowledge has seemingly changed between the 1988 and the 2012 ANES
surveys, this finding extends only to in-partisans. The findings presented here reflect political
psychology research which suggests that out-group members tend to be more sensitive to motivated
reasoning than in-group members. While knowledge has developed a moderating influence on how
in-partisans form economic judgments, out-partisans’ economic opinions seem to remain (mostly)
uninfluenced by variation in political knowledge.
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Figure 2.8. Change in Probability of Unfavorable Retrospective Economic Percpetions based on
Changes in Knowledge from the 5th to the 95th Percentile, 1988 ANES
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Unfavorable Retrospective Evaluations, 1988 ANES
Notes: First-differences indicate the change in the predicted probability of holding an unfavorable economic
perception based on a change from the 5th to the 95th percentiles of political knowledge; vertical bars indicate the
upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval.
2.6 Conclusions
The findings presented in this chapter provide new perspectives on how citizens form their
perceptions of economic performance. Building on the motivated reasoning literature, I have
demonstrated that the strength and direction of partisanship, as well as political knowledge, work
together to shape how individuals view the economy. I hypothesized that the motivation to confirm
prior beliefs when processing economic information would grow stronger for in-partisans as the
strength of partisanship and levels of knowledge increased. Analysis of the 2012 ANES offered
support for this expectation, while the 1988 analysis produced mostly null findings. I also pre-
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Figure 2.9. Change in Probability of Unfavorable Prospective Economic Percpetions based on
Changes in Knowledge from the 5th to the 95th Percentile, 1988 ANES
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Notes: First-differences indicate the change in the predicted probability of holding an unfavorable economic
perception based on a change from the 5th to the 95th percentiles of political knowledge; vertical bars indicate the
upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval.
dicted that the economic opinions of out-partisans, being more sensitive to motivational biases,
would be less influenced by variation in levels of political knowledge than in-partisans. The fact
that political knowledge did play a moderating role for the economic perceptions of in-partisans in
the 2012 ANES study, but not for out-partisans, confirms the tendency for out-partisans to be more
heavily influenced by their prior beliefs regardless of levels of political knowledge.
This chapter has established individual-level variation in the mechanisms through which
partisan identities shape the formation of economic judgments. The following two chapters move
beyond this single-level framework to take a better account of the objective economic context at
the state and county levels.
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CHAPTER 3
STATE-LEVEL ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND PARTISAN MOTIVATIONS IN
NATIONAL ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS
The use of partisanship as a cognitive shortcut for making political judgements has been
well-documented by scholars of public opinion and political psychology (Conover & Feldman
1989, Zaller 1992, Rahn 1993, Bartels 2000, Sniderman 2000, Goren 2005, Goren, Federico
& Kittilson 2009). Through motivated reasoning, people tend to process information in ways
that confirm their own prior beliefs while rejecting or counterarguing information that contradict
their prior beliefs (Lord, Ross & Lepper 1979, Kunda 1990, Rousseau & Snehal 1999, Lodge &
Taber 2000, Nir 2011). People are generally detached from the political world, caught up in their
own everyday problems and concerns, and identification with a partisan group makes the forma-
tion of political judgments less cognitively demanding. This dominance of partisanship for the
formation of political judgments has also been extended to economic voting, where scholars have
consistently demonstrated that voters tend to base their perceptions of the economy on prior polit-
ical attitudes (Wlezien, Franklin & Twiggs 1997, Bartels 2002, De Boef & Kellstedt 2004, Evans
& Anderson 2006, Gerber & Huber 2009, Evans & Pickup 2010, Gerber & Huber 2010, Enns,
Kellstedt & McAvoy 2012). Despite the wealth of evidence that partisanship shapes perceptions
of the economy, a larger question still looms over this literature: under what conditions might vot-
ers become more likely to dismiss their partisan leanings and rely instead on objective economic
information when asked to evaluate the economy?
Recent findings have shown that the use of partisanship as an information shortcut depends
on the congruence between partisan identities and evaluations of party performance (Lavine, John-
ston & Steenbergen 2012). When an individual’s identification with a political party and evaluation
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of the party’s performance come into conflict, he or she becomes less likely to rely on partisanship
as a shortcut for processing political information. These individuals turn instead to objective in-
formation when forming issue attitudes, evaluating political figures, and making voting decisions.
Moreover, the extent to which partisanship biases economic perceptions varies over time (Enns &
McAvoy 2012, Chzhen, Evans & Pickup 2014). I expect that this over time variation in how parti-
sanship shapes perceptions of the economy is linked to changes in the congruence between partisan
identities and evaluations. Economic conditions are a likely candidate for what might cause such
internal conflicts – partisans should become more likely to experience conflicts between their iden-
tities with a political party and their evaluations of the party’s performance during bad economic
times. As a result, they should become more likely to turn away from partisan shortcuts and look
instead for objective information when evaluating the economy. During good economic times,
partisan identities and evaluations should fall back into sync and partisanship will become a more
useful cue for evaluating the economy. In this chapter I test these theories using a multilevel anal-
ysis of the 1980-2012 ANES Time-Series studies and state-level economic data on unemployment
and per capita disposable income. The results offer strong support for the expectation that partisan
biases in economic perceptions are diminished in contexts with rising unemployment and little
growth in disposable income. On the other hand, the effects of political attitudes on economic
perceptions are significantly stronger in contexts with declining unemployment and higher levels
of growth in disposable income.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 reviews the literature on motivated reason-
ing in the formation of economic perceptions, as well as how the formation of those preferences
have been shown to vary over time and across individuals. Section 3.2 outlines my theoretical ex-
pectations for a moderating role of state-level economic conditions for partisan biases in economic
perceptions. Section 3.3 describes the data structure, methodological approaches, and multilevel
model specification used to empirically test the role of economic conditions in the relationship be-
tween political attitudes and economic perceptions. Section 3.4 presents the analysis and results,
and Section 3.5 concludes with a discussion of the findings and their implications for the study of
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economic voting and political information processing.
3.1 Motivated Reasoning in Economic Perceptions
The influence of partisanship for the formation of political judgments is often traced back
to the early work of Campbell et al. (1960).1 Despite some arguments that partisanship is the sum
of an ongoing process by which individuals update their political attitudes based on evaluations of
government performance (Downs 1957, Key 1966, Fiorina 1981, Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson
2002, Weinschenk 2010), there remains a strong concensus that partisanship is a highly influential
force for how individuals perceive the world and form political opinions (Rahn 1993, Bartels 2000,
Hetherington 2001, Bartels 2002, Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002, Johnston 2006, Lewis-Beck
et al. 2008, Gerber, Huber & Washington 2010, Tilley & Hobolt 2011). Whether grounded in
psychological attachments formed early in life (Campbell et al. 1960, Lewis-Beck et al. 2008) or
identities with specific social groups (Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee 1954, Miller & Wlezien
1993, Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002), the influence of partisanship for the processing of
political information is all but indisputable.
This use of partisanship as a cognitive shortcut is not unique to political science. A
well-established finding in the psychology literature is that individuals are prone to accept in-
formation which confirms prior beliefs while rejecting or couterarguing information which contra-
dicts prior beliefs (Lord, Ross & Lepper 1979, Kunda 1990, Rousseau & Snehal 1999, Lodge &
Taber 2000, Nir 2011). These motivated reasoners also tend to respond more strongly and more
quickly to information that confirms their own beliefs, while taking longer to process contradictory
information (Redlawsk 2002, Morris et al. 2003, Lodge & Taber 2005). In their review of the psy-
chological literature on motivated reasoning, Lavine, Johnston & Steenbergen (2012, pp. 27–29)
describe three primary goals that guide human reasoning and cognition: efficiency, accuracy, and
belief perseverance. First, people want to be efficient when processing information and making
1See also Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee (1954).
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decisions – that is, they wish to preserve as many cognitive resources as possible. Second, while
expending as little cognitive effort as possible, individuals still strive to be as accurate as possible
when processing information and making decisions. Third, human beings have an inherent desire
to preserve their own prior beliefs. In order to do so, people are often prone to forming appealing
conclusions even before efficiently and accurately processing information. Rarely can all three of
these goals be met without sacrificing at least one of the others. This three way trade-off between
efficiency, accuracy, and belief perseverance lies at the core of the social and psychological models
of partisanship. Partisanship is the most easily accessible cognitive shortcut for evaluating politi-
cal information, providing an efficient means of reaching conclusions that will confirm one’s prior
beliefs (Rahn 1993, Taber & Lodge 2006, Westen et al. 2006, Lebo & Cassino 2007, Taber, Cann
& Kucsova 2009, Jacobson 2010, Kim, Taber & Lodge 2010, Nir 2011, Jerit & Barabas 2012).2
The pervasive nature of partisanship is reflected in a similar debate within the economic
voting literature. Scholars argue for either a behavioral model of economic voting in which eval-
uations of economic performance shape political attitudes (Key 1966, Kinder & Kiewiet 1979,
Fiorina 1981, Kinder & Kiewiet 1981, Kiewiet 1983) or a psychological model in which polit-
ical attitudes shape perceptions of economic performance (Wlezien, Franklin & Twiggs 1997,
Bartels 2002, De Boef & Kellstedt 2004, Evans & Anderson 2006, Gerber & Huber 2009, Evans
& Pickup 2010, Gerber & Huber 2010, Gerber, Huber & Washington 2010, Enns, Kellstedt &
McAvoy 2012). Despite the normative appeal of an economic voter whose political attitudes are
continuously updated in order to reward or punish elected officials for economic performance, a
growing abundance of evidence increasingly suggests that individuals rely on political attitudes
(namely partisanship) as a shortcut for evaluating economic performance. Towards the end of
the Reagan adminstration, despite improvements in both unemployment and inflation, Democratic
identifiers overwhelmingly suggested that both conditions had gotten worse over the past two pres-
idential terms while Republican identifiers indicated that conditions had improved (Bartels 2002).
2The accuracy of such partisan-driven evaluations has led to a separate debate in the political science literature,
but the normative implications of cognitive shortcuts is beyond the scope of this study. For a discussion of those
implications, see Lau & Redlawsk (2001) and Bartels (1996).
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Other evidence suggests that partisanship, presidential approval, and vote choices had stronger
effects on economic perceptions than economic perceptions had on political attitudes (Evans &
Pickup 2010). Immediately following the success of the Democratic Party in the 2006 midterm
elections, Republican and Democratic identifiers were shown to abruptly change their perceptions
of the economy even despite very little objective change in economic conditions Gerber & Huber
(2010). On the aggregate-level, other findings have demonstrated that levels of consumer confi-
dence are strongly shaped by such political factors as attitudes toward the President and the party
of the President (De Boef & Kellstedt 2004, Lebo & Cassino 2007). These, among numerous other
findings, confirm that partisanship is not only used as a perceptual screen through which individu-
als form political judgments, but also for the formation of economic judgments. The overwhelming
consensus (and normative implication) of the contemporary economic voting literature is that the
traditional economic voter who provides democratic accountability through constant evaluation
and Bayesian updating, for the most part, simply does not exist (Anderson 2007).
Despite the vast evidence for motivated reasoning in the formation of political evaluations,
recent evidence has also suggested that the extent to which individuals rely on motivated reason-
ing might vary over time and across individuals. Among other findings, scholars have recently
demonstrated that the use of partisan motivated reasoning is diminished in circumstances where
an individual’s partisan identity conflicts with his or her evaluation of the party’s performance
(Lavine, Johnston & Steenbergen 2012). In particular, politically motivated biases in economic
perceptions have been shown to diminish as the national economic context deteriorates (Chzhen,
Evans & Pickup 2014, Dickerson 2015, Parker-Stephen 2013). While intriguing, these findings
did not directly model economic performance but instead compared individual-level analyses dur-
ing time periods characterized by varying national economic trends. In the following section, I
go on to describe some of these recent findings and how I expect them to extend to the forma-
tion of economic perceptions. In particular, I will outline my expectation that economic conditions
serve as an important source of congruence and conflict between partisan identities and evaluations
and therefore play an important role in the use of motivated reasoning when evaluating economic
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performance.
3.2 Theoretical Expectations
While political psychologists have presented substantial evidence that voters use motivated
reasoning when making political and economic judgments, some exceptions to the rule have also
been established. For example, the extent of partisan biases in economic perceptions have been
found to vary over time, with economic perceptions responding more slowly to real economic
changes during times when partisan biases are strongest (Enns & McAvoy 2012). One implication
of this finding is that during times when partisan biases are strongest, incumbents are less likely to
be held accountable for economic performance due to the delayed effect of economic conditions
on economic sentiment. But what conditions might lead these partisan biases to change over time?
Redlawsk, Civettini & Emmerson (2010) recently provided evidence that as individuals are con-
sistently exposed to information that conflicts with prior beliefs, they eventually reach a “tipping
point” where their own beliefs begin to shift. Other scholars have focused on the changing rela-
tionship between partisan identities and evaluations of party performance. When partisan identities
and evaluations of the party’s performance come into conflict, individuals have been shown to rely
less on party cues and more on objective information when forming issue attitudes, evaluating
candidates, and making voting decisions (Lavine, Johnston & Steenbergen 2012). For example,
leading up to the 2008 presidential election nearly two-thirds of Republican identifiers disapproved
of Bush’s handling of the economy and nearly half disapproved of his job performance as presi-
dent. Ten years earlier, when the economy was comparatively much better off, more than 90% of
Democratic identifiers approved of President Clinton’s job performance and handling of the econ-
omy.3 Much like the argument made by Redlawsk, Civettini & Emmerson (2010), the disillusioned
Republicans in 2008 had been consistently exposed to negative economic information to the point
3From the 1998 and 2008 ANES Time-Series Studies: In 2008, 62.6% of respondents who identified as either
a strong, weak, or independent-leaning Republicans disapproved of Bush’s handling of the economy, and 46.3%
disapproved of his job performance as President; in 1998, 94.4% of respondents who identified as either strong, weak,
or independent-leaning Democrats approved of Clinton’s handling of the economy, and 91.1% approved of his job
performance as President.
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that their own views of the Republican president’s performance began to change. As described
by Lavine, Johnston & Steenbergen (2012), a conflict had arisen between partisan identities and
evaluations of party performance – the result was a weaker role of partisanship in the formation of
political judgements.
All of these findings suggest that the extent to which individuals use motivated reasoning
when making political decisions is not constant across individuals or across time. I argue that a
major source of variation in the use of motivated reasoning is the economy. Determining when in-
dividuals are most likely to rely on information shortcuts depends on how they prioritize their goals
of efficiency, accuracy, and belief perseverance. The use of partisanship as a cognitive shortcut of-
ten meets the goals of efficiency and belief perseverance, occasionally at the expense of accuracy.
But under what conditions might individuals assign more weight to the goal of making accurate
judgements than efficient or belief-confirming judgments? Psychologists have adopted the notion
of a sufficiency threshold, or a desired level of confidence in a decision or evaluation (Chaiken,
Liberman & Eagly 1989, Payne, Bettman & Johnson 1993, Lavine, Johnston & Steenbergen 2012).
When partisan shortcuts lead to a decision that falls below the sufficiency threshold, the resulting
confidence gap leads an individual to seek out more objective information to increase their subjec-
tive confidence. Given that individuals are more heavily exposed to negative economic information
than positive information (Hetherington 1996, Sanders & Gavin 2004, Soroka 2006) and respond
more strongly to such negative information (Taylor 1991, Baumeister et al. 2001), the state of
the economy can impact the size of the gap between an individual’s desired and actual levels of
confidence in their evaluation of the economy. Partisan heuristics are thus more likely to lead
to economic perceptions that lie closer to the sufficiency threshold during good economic times
than bad economic times. As such, I expect individuals to rely more heavily on objective infor-
mation when evaluating the economy during bad economic times, while relying more heavily on
partisanship as a cognitive heuristic during good economic times.
The role of objective economic conditions for the relationship between political and eco-
nomic attitudes is a relatively new contribution to an old literature. The political context has been
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shown to have a profound impact on the formation of economic perceptions (Gerber & Huber 2010)
and a variety of other issue attitudes (Dancey & Goren 2010, Highton & Kam 2011), but much less
attention has been paid to the economic context. In their analysis of the relationship between parti-
sanship and economic evaluations during the 1992-1997 British election cycle, Evans & Anderson
(2006) stated:
“It is plausible that a disastrous economy [. . .] would elicit shared and reason-
ably perceptive responses that are not powerfully affected by political conditioning,
but when an economy is relatively stable [. . .] partisan “contamination” of voters’
understanding of economic performance is much more likely. In such cases yearly
changes in economic performance are typically not distinctive enough to produce a
shared, accurate assessment of how the economy is doing.” (p. 195)
As economic voting scholars became distracted by the debate between whether political attitudes
shape economic perceptions of vice versa (Lewis-Beck 2006), Evans & Anderson (2006) were
offering the suggestion that the tendency for partisanship to shape economic attitudes might depend
on the broader economic context. This theory was only recently subjected to empirical testing when
it was shown that the relationship between government approval and economic perceptions in Great
Britain was most likely to be exogenous during periods of economic growth and endogenous during
periods of economic decline (Chzhen, Evans & Pickup 2014). Local levels of unemployment
have also been shown to influence national election outcomes in both British and Welsh elections
(Johnston et al. 2000).
Other evidence suggests that when voters are exposed to economic information that moves
in both positive and negative directions, partisan disagreement is more likely to occur. On the other
hand, when economic information moves in only one direction partisanship plays less of a role in
the formation of economic attitudes (Parker-Stephen 2013). It has also been shown that when such
conflicting information comes from partisan sources, individuals become more likely to engage
in partisan motivated reasoning (Price 1989, Huddy 2001, Slothuus & de Vreese 2010) and that
out-party cues tend to be more powerful than in-party cues (Goren, Federico & Kittilson 2009).
Given these recent findings, the expectation that economic conditions play a role in the formation
of individual-level economic perceptions is well-warranted.
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We can therefore expect individuals to be more prone to partisan motivated reasoning when
evaluating the economy during times when economic conditions are relatively well off. On the
other hand, as economic conditions decline individuals should be more heavily exposed to neg-
ative information that conflicts with their partisan identities, making them more likely to rely on
objective economic information when forming economic judgments. I hypothesize that in states
with rising unemployment and declining income levels, individuals will rely less on motivated rea-
soning when evaluating the economy. In these states, we should see weaker effects of partisanship
on the formation of economic perceptions. For states with declining unemployment and rising
levels of income, individuals should be more prone to rely on motivated reasoning when evaluat-
ing the economy. In these states, partisanship should be seen as a more useful tool for achieving
the goals of efficiency, accuracy, and belief perseverance, and thus the effects of partisanship on
economic evaluations should be stronger.
I expect the moderating role of economic conditions to apply primarily to the relationship
between partisanship and retrospective economic evaluations and less so for prospective evalua-
tions. Most of the economic voting literature suggests that the average individual weighs retrospec-
tive evaluations more heavily than prospective evaluations, with only the most sophisticated voters
using a rational expectations framework for translating prospective economic perceptions into po-
litical evaluations (MacKuen, Erikson & Stimson 1992). Scholars have also frequently argued that
the systematic processing of objective information requires a sufficient level of knowledge or so-
phistication (Neuman 1986, Krosnick 1991, Zaller 1992, Sniderman, Tetlock & Brody 1993, Delli
Carpini & Keeter 1996, Kam 2005, Lau & Redlawsk 2006). Since the same individuals who
weigh prospective evaluations more heavily than retrospective evaluations are the same individu-
als who are most capable of systematically processing objective information, I don’t expect to find
as strong of a moderating role of economic conditions for the relationship between partisanship
and prospective evaluations as I expect to find for retrospective evaluations.4
4This is not to suggest that more sophisticated individuals are any less likely to use partisan shortcuts than less
sophisticated individuals (see Zaller 1992), but simply that the degree of partisan biases in economic perceptions will
vary less with economic conditions for prospective economic evaluations.
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I focus exclusively on the role of state-level economic conditions for both theoretical and
empirical reasons. First, national economic conditions are primarily aggregated abstracts of local-
ized economic conditions (Gimpel & Reeves 2012). While variation in national economic indica-
tors certainly derive from variations in local economic conditions, an increase or decrease in the
national unemployment rate, inflation, or GDP is by no means a variation that is generalizable to
regions across the country. Even as national economic conditions improve, local conditions may
remain the same or continue to deteriorate. Second, we can expect the role of local information in
the formation of economic perceptions to vary between in-partisans and out-partisans. Individuals
who strongly identify with the party of the President are more likely to incorporate positive lo-
cal information into their assessment of the national economy, while out-partisans are more likely
to incorporate negative local information. As a result, localized economic conditions serve as a
source of variation in objective economic conditions at a given point in time, as well as the utiliza-
tion of subjective information across individuals at a given point in time (Dettrey & Palmer 2014).
Third, recent research has shown that people tend to form economic opinions in the same way as
people who face similar circumstances as themselves (Ansolabehere, Meredith & Snowberg 2014).
From this perspective, voters don’t necessarily need to know detailed information about their local
economy to be able to respond to the local context.5 Local economic conditions have also been
shown to have a significant impact on retrospective evaluations of the national economy (Books &
Prysby 1999), as well as presidential election outcomes (Johnston et al. 2000, Healy & Lenz 2014).
Finally, localized economic conditions provide a source of valuable cross-sectional and temporal
variation for an empirical analysis of individuals nested within groups. State-level unemployment
and income don’t just vary over time, but also across states at a given point in time.6
5A simple sports analogy helps illustrate this fact: everyone who attends a professional sporting event doesn’t need
to know the two teams’ histories, win percentages, rulebooks, and officiating signals in order to respond to events in
the game in the same ways and at the same times as the other spectators.
6See Figure 3 and the Appendix for a description of the variation in state-level unemployment and per capita
disposable income.
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3.3 Data and Methodological Approaches
Data for the following analyses come from the 1980-2012 American National Election
Studies (ANES), supplemented with state-level economic data on unemployment and per capita
disposable income (PCDI). The 1980 ANES Time-Series study is the earliest of the surveys to
include items that probe respondents’ evaluations of the national economy. Surveys were then
conducted at two year intervals from 1980 until 2004 and at four year intervals from 2004 until
2012. The specific variable codings for the survey data can be found in the Appendix. State-level
unemployment data were obtained from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics,7 and PCDI
data were obtained from the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis.8 Since each of the ANES
surveys were conducted during November of each survey year, I measure 12-month net changes in
seasonally-adjusted state unemployment rates from November of the previous year to November
of the survey year as well as current levels of unemployment during November of each survey year.
Similarly, I measure PCDI as the percent change from the previous period to November of each
survey year as well as current (logged) levels in November of each survey year.9
In the following analyses, I use both retrospective and prospective evaluations of the na-
tional economy as dependent variables. To measure retrospective evaluations, survey respondents
were asked, “Would you say that over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten better, stayed
about the same, or gotten worse?” A follow-up question then asked respondents, “Would you say
much better (worse) or somewhat better (worse)?” Responses to these two items were then coded
as a five-point scale ranging from much worse to much better. For prospective evaluations, respon-
dents were asked, “What about the next 12 months? Do you expect the economy to get better,
get worse, or stay about the same?” Only some surveys asked a follow-up question similar to that
used for retrospective evaluations. Since the five-point prospective measure is not available in
7http://www.bls.gov
8http://www.bea.gov
9Both current levels and net changes in economic conditions are of theoretical interest because we might expect the
moderating role of net changes in economic conditions on the relationship between economic perceptions and political
attitudes to vary depending on current levels of economic health. For example, a 0.5% change in unemployment is
likely to be seen as less dramatic in a state with a current unemployment rate of 2.5% than in a state with a current
unemployment rate of 10.5%.
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every survey, I use the original three-point scale that ranges from much worse to much better.10
For the purposes of this chapter, using both retrospective and prospective evaluations as depen-
dent variables is primarily for robustness. In Chapter 5, the difference between retrospective and
prospective evaluations becomes more theoretically clear, as levels of information have been shown
to influence the retrospective or prospective nature of how partisans form economic opinions.
The primary individual-level explanatory variable is coded the same as in the previous
chapter. Instead of relying on the traditional 7-point Republican-Democrat ANES scale, the mea-
sure was first recoded as a 7-point scale ranging from -3 (strong out-partisans) to +3 (strong in-
partisans), with pure independents centered at zero. It is important to note that for the purposes of
this study, in-partisans are considered to be respondents who identify with the party of the current
president during each survey year. This new measure was then folded into two separate measures,
one for in-partisans and one for out-partisans. For the in-partisan measure, in-partisan leaners are
coded as 1, weak in-partisans coded as 2, and strong in-partisans coded as 3 with pure independents
and all out-partisans collapsed into zero. Similarly, for the out-partisan measure, out-partisan lean-
ers are coded as 1, weak out-partisans coded as 2, and strong out-partisans coded as 3 with pure
independents and all in-partisans collapsed into zero. By including both of these measures in the
same model, pure independents are essentially treated as the baseline group while allowing for dif-
ferent effects for in-partisans and out-partisans. The 7-point measure of in-partisan strength fails
to capture any asymmetrical effects between in-party and out-party members, which the previous
chapter has already established to exist.
As a robustness check, I also test models with presidential approval as the primary individual-
level explanatory variable. Since ambivalent partisans might identify with the party of a President
but disapprove of the President’s job performance, it is useful to use both partisanship and presi-
dential approval as proxies for political attitudes. To measure presidential approval, respondents
were asked, “Do you approve or disapprove of the way that [the president] is handling his job as
10The prospective economic evaluation item was not included in the 2002 ANES study. Thus, in the following
analyses that use prospective evaluations as the dependent variable, survey data are available every two years from
1980 to 2000 and every four years from 2000 to 2012.
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President?” A follow-up question then asked respondents, “Do you approve (disapprove) strongly
or not strongly?” Responses to these two items were then coded as a four-point scale ranging from
disapprove strongly to approve strongly. Results from these models were almost identical to those
using the two partisanship measures and are available in the Appendix for this chapter.
3.3.1 Why State-level Performance?
A popular criticism of studies relying on local economic performance as a measure of
the economic context is that voters might be largely unaware of their state’s economic perfor-
mance. The media undoubtedly pays more attention to the national economy than individual state
economies. Moreover, economic performance often varies dramatically within states, as well as
across states. For example, economic conditions might be starkly different in a rural county than
in a neighboring urban county. It is therefore necessary to present a defense of state-level perfor-
mance before proceeding into the analysis.
First, no individual citizen actually experiences a national economy, as “[t]he state of the
national economy is but a set a summary measures averaged across thousands of communities and
millions of individuals” (Gimpel & Reeves 2012, pp. 509). Thus, while individuals might be
exposed to information on the national economy through media coverage and political discourse,
no one actually experiences national-level performance. Any measure of national economic per-
formance fails to capture the dramatic variation in the economy that occurs across localities. Fur-
thermore, the pocketbook versus sociotropic debate on how voters utilize economic information to
inform their economic judgments represents two extremes: one within the individual herself, and
the other in the national economy. A growing body of research has demonstrated that numerous
mechanisms exist within these two extremes that also work to shape economic perceptions. Lo-
cal unemployment rates, fuel prices, and home forclosures have all been shown to influence how
citizens perceive the national economy (Books & Prysby 1999, Gimpel & Reeves 2012, Johnston
et al. 2000, Weatherford 1983).
The focus of this particular chapter is on the asymmetrical tendency for partisans to use
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information from their state’s economy to inform national economic perceptions. Later in the
chapter, I expand on the use of state-level performance as a measure of the economic context by
demonstrating that national economic perceptions, when aggregated, do indeed follow state-level
performance very closely over time. I also go on to demonstrate the methodological advantages of
state-level performance for a multilevel analysis of economic perceptions. Specifically, I show that
state-level performance tends to follow national economic trends very closely, while also providing
important variation across states within survey years. In Chapter 4, I take the analyses presented
here a step further by examining economic performance at the county-level.
3.3.2 Model Specification
In its most basic form, the individual-level relationship between economic perceptions and
partisanship (with exogenous controls excluded for space purposes) can be modeled as
Yi = β0 +β1Xi+ εi (3.1)
where Yi is an individual’s perception of the national economy, Xi is an individual’s partisanship,
and εi is the unobserved disturbance term. The relationship between an individual’s economic
perception and in-party strength is captured by β1 and, since in-party strength has pure indepen-
dents centered at zero, β0 captures the average economic perception for pure independents. An
important factor that this basic model does not capture is how this individual-level relationship
can vary across groups. If the relationship between partisanship and economic perceptions varies
with state-level economic conditions, then a model is needed that can allow the intercept and slope
to be different for individuals in different groups. Since individuals are nested within states, this
basic model can be extended to allow β0 and β1 to vary across states as a function of state-level
economic performance, so that
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Level 1 Yi j = β0 j+β1 jXi j+ εi j
Level 2 β0 j = γ00 + γ01Wj+µ0 j
β1 j = γ10 + γ11Wj+µ1 j
(3.2)
where Wj is a state-level economic indicator11 and i and j are subscripts indexing individuals and
states, respectively. In the second level of Equation 3.2, the first portion (β0 j) allows the average
economic perception of pure independents12 to vary with state-level economic conditions. The
second portion of the second-level equation allows the amount of change in economic perceptions
given a one-unit change in partisanship to vary with state-level economic conditions. In the random
intercept portion of the second level of the model, γ00 represents the grand mean intercept, γ01
represents the effect of the state-level economic indicator on the intercept, and µ0 j is the random
variance of the intercept aross states. In the random effects portion of the second level model, γ10
represents the grand mean of the effect of Xi j on economic perceptions, γ11 represents the change
in the effect of partisanship on economic perceptions across values of the Level 2 indicator (i.e.,
the interaction between the Level 1 and Level 2 predictors), and µ1 j is the random variance of
the slope across states. Thus, Equation 3.2 can be rearranged by plugging the two portions of the
second-level equation in for the intercept and slope in the first-level equation, so that
Yi j = γ00 + γ01Wj+ γ10Xi j+ γ11(Wj)(Xi j)+µ1 jXi j+µ0 j+ εi j (3.3)
where γ01 is the main effect of state-level economic conditions, γ10 is the main effect of parti-
11In the analyses that follow, models include more than one state-level economic indicator and separate measures for
in-partisans and out-partisans. I only include one first-level and second-level indicator in Equation 3.2 for simplicity
purposes and to save space.
12In the full models, pure independents are treated as the baseline group so that the intercept in the first-level
equation simply indicates the average economic perception for pure independents in states with no change in state-
level economic conditions.
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sanship, and γ11 is the coefficient for the interaction between the two predictors. The variance
across states for the slope, the intercept, and the remaining unobserved disturbance are captured
by µ1 j, µ0 j, and εi j, respectively. The paramter of most interest in Equation 3 is γ11, which will
determine how the effect of partisanship on economic perceptions varies with state-level economic
conditions.
To facilitate interpretation of the main effects parameters and the coefficients for the in-
teraction terms, I have centered levels of state unemployment and levels of logged PCDI at their
mean values. Therefore, γ10 (the main effect of partisanship) can be interpreted as the difference in
economic perceptions based on a one-unit change in partisanship for individuals in states with av-
erage levels of unemployment and PCDI, and no net change in unemployment or PCDI. Similarly,
the main effects estimates for each state-level economic indicator can be interpreted as the change
in economic perception based on a one-point change in the economic indicator for individuals who
identify as pure independents.
It is also important to note that continuous-by-continuous interaction terms and their statis-
tical significance should be interpreted with caution since they measure conditional relationships.
Taken by itself, the coefficient for an interaction term is not very meaningful – instead, the coeffi-
cients for the constituent terms and their interaction need to be taken into account in order to make
an inference about a conditional relationship (Brambor, Clark & Golder 2006). One approach to
interpretting these interaction terms is to calculate the marginal effects of one of the constituent
terms on the outcome variable across values of the other constituent term. For example, in Equation
3 the marginal effect of partisanship on economic perceptions can be calculated as
δY
δX
= γ10 + γ11Wj (3.4)
By computing the marginal effect of partisanship on economic perceptions at each value of the
state-level economic predictor, we can observe how the relationship between partisanship and eco-
nomic perceptions changes with economic conditions.
Since both dependent variables used in the following analyses (retrospective and prospec-
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tive economic perceptions) are ordinal measures, caution should typically be exercised in interpret-
ing statistical results. The most appropriate method of analysis for limited dependent variables is
an ordered probit or ordered logit model. However, comparing the results of mixed effects models
estimated via maximum likelihood estimation (such as those described above) with results from
mixed effects ordered probit models did not indicate any substantial differences. For interpretation
purposes, the analyses that follow estimate mixed effects via maximum likelihood – ordered probit
results for each model are available in the Appendix (Table 8 and Table 9) for comparison.
3.4 Analysis
An examination of the survey time series reveals several interesting features of the relation-
ship between economic perceptions and political attitudes. As expected, retrospective economic
perceptions are strongly correlated with the strength of an individual’s identification with the in-
cumbent President’s party. For the entire pooled survey sample, retrospective evaluations and
partisanship have a correlation coefficient of 0.30. If the two are aggregated by taking the yearly
means, the correlation coefficient goes up to 0.60. In order to better visualize this relationship, the
top panel in Figure 3.1 plots the average retrospective economic perception for Democratic and
Republican identifiers from 1980 to 2012. The blue line in the figure represents respondents iden-
tifying as strong Democrats, and the red line represents respondents identifying as strong Republi-
cans; pure independents are excluded but tend to fall roughly between Democratic and Republican
identifiers. At first glance, Democratic and Republican perceptions of the economy seem to follow
one another very closely. However, a closer examination reveals an interesting trend. Shortly fol-
lowing each election year in which the party of the President switched from one party to the other
(indicated by vertical dashed lines), we notice that the average retrospective economic evaluations
for Democratic and Republican identifiers cross paths. Under Republican presidents, Republican
identifiers view the economy more favorably and under Democratic presidents, Democratic iden-
tifiers view the economy more favorably. Another interesting feature is the decline in economic
perceptions among Republicans during George W. Bush’s second term as President. Although
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Republican economic evaluations remained more positive than Democratic evaluations throughout
the Bush presidency, Republican evaluations began to fall sharply following the 2004 presidential
elections. A likely explanation for this sharp decline is the conflict many Republicans experienced
between their partisan identities and evaluations (Lavine, Johnston & Steenbergen 2012). As sup-
port for Bush’s foreign policy towards the Middle East began to decline, ambivalence experienced
by Republican identifiers found its way into their economic attitudes even before the onset of the
Great Recession in 2008. Chapter 4 takes a closer look at how partisans responded to the 2008
financial crisis.
The bottom panel of Figure 3.1 similarly plots the average prospective evaluations of the
national economy for strong Democrats and strong Republicans. While the correlation between
prospective evaluations and partisanship is somewhat weaker than the correlation between retro-
spective evaluations and partisanship (0.17 for the entire pooled sample and 0.21 for the yearly
aggregates), the trend remains the same – partisans hold better expectations of future economic
performance when they identify with the party of the incumbent President. During periods with
a Democratic President, Democratic identifiers expect the national economy to improve slightly
more over the next twelve months than Republican identifiers. Similarly, during periods with a Re-
publican President, Republican identifiers expect the national economy to improve slightly more
over the next twelve months than Democratic identifiers. For example, during most of the latter
Bush’s administration, Republican identifiers had significantly higher expectations of the national
economy than Democratic identifiers. Again, Republican expectations reached a tipping point after
the 2004 election as Republican identifiers became disillusioned with Bush’s foreign and economic
policy (Lavine, Johnston & Steenbergen 2012). As Republican identities and evaluations began to
conflict, a slight drop in economic expectations can be observed among Republicans during Bush’s
second term. Immediately following the start of the 2008 financial crisis and the election of Barack
Obama, Democratic economic expectations surged greatly while Republican expectations contin-
ued to decline.
The focus of this chapter, as well as the rest of the study, is on the relationship between
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Figure 3.1. Mean Retrospective and Prospective Economic Perceptions by Partisanship, 1980-
2012
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Notes: Data were obtained through the American National Election Studies, 1980-2012 Time Series Studies. Dashed
vertical lines indicate presidential election years in which the party of the President flipped; pure independents are
excluded.
partisanship and economic perceptions. Nonetheless, it is useful to also examine the relationship
between presidential approval and economic perceptions. The correlation coefficient between ret-
rospective evaluations and approval for the individual-level pooled sample is 0.43 and increases
to 0.82 when aggregated by year. The top panel in Figure 3.2 plots the average economic percep-
tions and approval ratings of ANES survey respondents from 1980 to 2012, illustrating a strong
relationship between how Americans evaluate the President’s job performance and how they ret-
rospectively evaluate the economy. With the exception of a brief period surrounding the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, retrospective evaluations and presidential approval move together
almost completely in unison. The terrorist attacks in 2001 generated a ‘rally ’round the flag effect
that led to a surge in presidential approval, while also leading to negative speculation about the
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effects of the attacks on the global economy. Thus, the disparity between retrospective economic
perceptions and presidential approval between the 2000 and 2002 ANES surveys is not entirely
surprising. By the 2004 presidential election, economic perceptions and presidential approval fell
back into sync with one another. The relationship between economic perceptions and presidential
approval is very similar, as shown in the appendix for this chapter.
The first step in examining how the local economy moderates the relationship between
partisanship and economic perceptions is defining the local economic environment. The local
economy inherently exists somewhere between the performance of the national economy at one
extreme, and an individual’s own personal financial situation at the other extreme. Three require-
ments need to be met in order for a certain level of economic performance to serve as an appropriate
proxy for the economic environment in which partisans’ judgments are made. First, enough vari-
ation in economic performance needs to exist across states and over time in order to conduct an
appropriate multilevel analysis. Second, state-level performance needs to follow national perfor-
mance closely enough to justify its use as a proxy for how citizens perceive the national economy.
And third, if these first two requirements are met, then aggregate subjective evaluations of the
national economy should follow changes in state-level performance relatively closely.
First, in order to determine how the economic context moderates the degree to which polit-
ical attitudes bias economic perceptions, enough variation in economic conditions is needed both
across contexts and over time. State-level economic conditions are useful for this purpose because
of the variation they provide over time, as well as across states. While many individuals might be
more heavily exposed to national economic information, an individual who is directly affected by
or exposed to the effects of the economy are more likely to be affected by local economic con-
ditions. For example, a high national unemployment rate does not mean that unemployment has
risen equally across all states, or even risen at all in every state. Even as national unemployment
rises, individuals in certain regions may still prosper or be entirely isolated from national economic
trends. Thus, national economic conditions represent little more than abstract aggregates of local
economic conditions. Such aggregate measures eliminate all local variation, and as a result are of
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Figure 3.2. State-level Unemployment and Per Capita Disposable Income, 1980-2012
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little use for an analysis of individuals nested within economically distinct clusters.
Figure 3.3 plots variation in economic performance across states and survey years. For
example, the top left panel of the figure plots twelve-month net changes in state unemployment
rates along with the yearly average across all states and the grand mean of all states across all
survey years. In 1986, for example, the average net change in unemployment across all fifty states
and the District of Columbia was just below zero – indicating that, nationally, unemployment did
not change much between November 1985 and November 1986. However, many states that same
year experienced increases in unemployment of up to almost 2.5%, while other states saw their
unemployment rates drop almost 2% from November of 1985. The same can be said for percent
changes in PCDI from one period to the next. In 2008, for example, the average change in income
across all states was just under about 5%, yet some states saw no change at all (or even slightly
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negative changes) while other states saw increases of up to about 13%.
Figure 3.3 also illustrates significant variation in current levels of unemployment and PCDI
across states and years. Since levels of unemployment and PCDI are centered at the mean values,
we can interpret values of zero as average levels of each indicator.13 In the top right panel of the
figure, we can again see significant variation in levels of unemployment across all states in each
survey year. Regardless of the yearly average across states, each survey year shows tremendous
differences in the unemployment rate across states. None of this information would be captured by
a single yearly national unemployment rate. The same applies to levels of PCDI. While the vari-
ation in logged PCDI across states in each survey year may seem small compared to the variation
in unemployment rates, the actual (non-logged) values of PCDI in the entire sample range from a
minimum of $6,419 to a maximum of $65,770 with a mean of $23,735.03 and a standard deviation
of 10,641.66. Thus, levels of PCDI clearly vary substantially across states and over time.
The first set of results is shown below in Table 3.1. In Model 1 retrospective economic per-
ceptions are used as the dependent variable with partisanship and each of the economic indicators
as the primary explanatory variables, while Model 2 uses prospective economic perceptions as the
dependent variable. As mentioned in the previous section, the measure for partisanship is centered
over pure independents and levels of unemployment and PCDI are centered at their grand mean
values. In the second set of results, presented in Table 2, I measure political attitudes as approval
of the President’s job performance in order to check for the robustness of the first set of findings.
3.4.1 Retrospective Economic Perceptions, Partisanship, and State-level Economic Perfor-
mance
Table 3.1 shows mixed effects estimates of retrospective economic perceptions as a function
of partisanship and state-level economic performance. Note that survey year fixed effects are also
included in the model with 2008 treated as the baseline year, but are excluded for space purposes.
Looking first at the intercept in the fixed effects portion of the model, the results suggest that for a
13Levels of unemployment and PCDI are centered at their grand mean values, so a value of zero indicates the mean
across all states and all survey years.
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Figure 3.3. Mean Net Changes in State Unemployment Rates and Yearly Net Changes in National-
level Unemployment Rates, 1980-2012
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Notes: Both state and national unemployment data were obtained online from the United States Bureau of Labor
statistics (http://www.bls.gov); net-changes in national unemployment rates are seasonally adjusted.
pure independent in a state with no changes in economic performance, the expected retrospective
economic perception during 2008 was about 1.85 on the five-point scale of economic perceptions.
For each one-unit increase in the strength of identification with the incumbent presidential party
(assuming no changes in state-level economic performance), this expected economic perception
increases by about 0.07 points; for each unit increase in the strength of identification with the
out-party (also assuming no change in state-level economic performance), this expected economic
perception decreases by about 0.02 points. Before looking at the cross-level interactions, which
present the most interesting results, the random effects portion of the model suggests that the effect
of in-partisan strength had a standard deviation across states of about 0.04. The standard deviation
of the effect of out-partisan strength was not statistically different from zero, nor did the intercept
which suggests that the effect of identifying as a pure independent also did not vary significantly
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Figure 3.4. Mean Retrospective Evaluations of the National Economy and 12-month Net Changes
in State Unemployment, 1980-2012
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Notes: Mean economic perceptions are the average response to the traditional ANES item gauging retrospective
evaluations of the national economy over the last 12-months (scaled one (unfavorable) to five (favorable)).
across states.
The cross-level interactions should be interpretted with caution as they indicate conditional
relationships. Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 plot the marginal effects of each partisan measure on ret-
rospective economic perceptions across the range of both net changes in state unemployment rates
and percent changes in per capita disposable income, respectively. Looking first at the left panel
of Figure 3.6, the marginal effects of in-party strength on retrospective economic perceptions are
plotted across the range of net changes in state unemployment rates. The results indicate that for in-
partisans in states with two-percentage point decreases in unemployment (the minimum observed
value), each unit shift in the strength of party identification had a marginal effect on retrospective
economic evaluations of about 0.13. This effect drops off as net changes in unemployment in-
crease. For in-partisans in states with six-percentage point increases in state unemployment rates,
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Table 3.1. Mixed Effects Estimates of Retrospective Economic Perceptions as a Function of Par-
tisanship and Local Economic Performance, with Year Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects Estimate Robust SE
In-partisan 0.072c 0.010
Out-partisan −0.019c 0.008
∆ St. unemployment −0.043c 0.012
∆ PCDI† 0.051c 0.020
∆ St. unemployment*In-partisan −0.027c 0.005
∆ St. unemployment*Out-partisan 0.017c 0.006
∆ PCDI*In-partisan −0.007c 0.009
∆ PCDI*Out-partisan −0.012c 0.007
State Unemployment Rate† −0.025 0.013
State PCDI† 0.033 0.025
State population (logged) −0.001 0.011
Education† 0.074∗∗∗ 0.007
Ideology† −0.033∗∗∗ 0.008
Presidential approval† 0.369∗∗∗ 0.010
Employment status −0.181∗∗∗ 0.028
Age† −0.008∗∗∗ 0.007
Intercept 1.846∗∗∗ 0.162
State Random Effects Std. Deviation Robust SE
σ (Intercept) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
σ (In-partisan) 0.035∗∗∗ 0.018
σ (Out-partisan) 0.000 0.000
Observations 21,724
States 51
Note: Parameters were estimated via full maximum likelihood with 2008 as the baseline year.
† Standardized to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
c Conditional relationship; see marginal effects plots.
∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗∗ p<0.001
each unit shift in the strength of party identification had a marginal effect of retrospective eco-
nomic evaluations of about -0.10. As expected, these results suggest that as state unemployment
rates rise, the effect of partisan strength on economic perceptions decreases.
Turning to the right panel of Figure 3.6, the marginal effects of out-party strength on ret-
rospective economic evaluations are similarly plotted across the range of net changes in state un-
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Figure 3.5. Marginal Effects of Partisanship on Retrospective Economic Perceptions,
by Net Changes in State Unemployment
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Notes: Marginal effects were postestimated from the model shown in Table 3.1; dashed lines indicate the 95%
confidence interval.
employment rates. The results indicate that for out-partisans in states with two-percentage point
decreases in unemployment (the observed minimum value), each unit increase in the strength of
out-party identities had a marginal effect on retrospective economic evaluations of only about 0.05.
Looking at the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence intervals, this effect became statisti-
cally indistinguishable from zero for out-partisans in states with no net changes in unemployment
up to those in states with five-percentage point increases in unemployment. Only for out-partisans
in states with six-percentage point increases in unemployment did this effect become statistically
different from zero, but still with an effect of less than 0.10. These results suggest that the mod-
erating effect of net changes in state unemployment rates on the relationship between partisanship
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Figure 3.6. Marginal Effects of Partisanship on Retrospective Economic Perceptions,
by Changes in PCDI
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Notes: Marginal effects were postestimated from the model shown in Table 3.1; dashed lines indicate the 95%
confidence interval.
and retrospective economic perceptions is stronger for in-partisans than for out-partisans.
Figure 3.7 also plots the marginal effects of each partisan measure on retrospective eco-
nomic perceptions, this time across the range of percent changes in per capita disposable income
(PCDI) from the period preceding each ANES survey. Looking first at the left panel of the figure,
the results show no statistically significant change in the effect of in-partisan strength on retro-
spective economic perceptions across the range of changes in PCDI. In-partisans in states with
-5% decreases in income (the minimum observed value) had a marginal effect on retrospective
evaluations of about 0.10, compared to those in states with 4% increases in income (the maximum
observed value) who had a marginal effect of about 0.05 on retrospective evaluations. However,
the 95% confidence interval suggests that these two effect sizes are not statistically different from
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one another.14
The right panel of Figure 3.7 similarly plots the marginal effects of out-partisan strength
on retrospective economic evaluations across the range percent changes in per capita disposable
income. Again, the difference in effect sizes for out-partisans in states with the lowest observed
changes in PCDI and those in states with the highest observed changes in PCDI are not statistically
different. These null findings for a moderating effect of changes in income for the relationship
between partisanship and retrospective economic evaluations suggest that per capita disposable
income simply might not be the most suitable measure of state-level economic performance. One
explanation for this is that income levels tend to vary across states with the cost of living, as well as
over time with levels of inflation, thus making it difficult to use income data to compare economic
performance across states over such a long time period.
3.4.2 Prospective Economic Perceptions, Partisanship, and State-level Economic Perfor-
mance
Table 3.2 replicates the analysis shown in the previous subsection using prospective evalu-
ations of the national economy instead of retrospective evaluations. Note that since not all of the
ANES surveys included follow-up questions for the prospective items, the dependent variable in
Table 3.2 is a three-point measure of how respondents expect the national economy to perform
over the next twelve months, coded as follows: 1) “worse”; 2) “about the same”; 3) “better”.
Again, survey year fixed effects are also included in the model with the 2008 survey excluded as
the baseline year, but are omitted from the table for space purposes. Looking first at the fixed
effects portion of the model, the intercept indicates that for a pure independent in a state with no
change in economic performance during 2008, the average prospective economic evaluation was
about 2.08 on the three-point scale. Compared to the results from Table 3.1, this indicates that
the grand mean economic perception was more positive for the prospective survey item than the
14A useful rule of thumb when examining marginal effects plots is to imagine a horizontal line drawn through the
upper and lower confidence bands. If the imaginary horizontal line falls within the range of the confidence bands
across the entire x-axis, then the marginal effects sizes are not significantly changing with the moderator variable (in
this case the state-level economic indicator.
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Table 3.2. Mixed Effects Estimates of Prospective Economic Perceptions as a Function of Parti-
sanship and Local Economic Performance, with Year Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects Estimate Robust SE
In-partisan 0.074c 0.007
Out-partisan 0.043c 0.006
∆ St. unemployment 0.006c 0.020
∆ PCDI† 0.007c 0.015
∆ St. unemployment*In-partisan −0.012c 0.005
∆ St. unemployment*Out-partisan 0.001c 0.007
∆ PCDI*In-partisan −0.014c 0.005
∆ PCDI*Out-partisan −0.011c 0.006
State Unemployment Rate† 0.020 0.011
State PCDI† −0.0003 0.019
State population (logged) −0.004 0.011
Education† 0.005 0.006
Ideology† −0.004 0.006
Presidential approval† 0.156∗∗∗ 0.006
Employment status 0.020 0.026
Age† 0.006 0.005
Intercept 2.083∗∗∗ 0.151
State Random Effects Std. Deviation Robust SE
σ (Intercept) 0.032∗∗∗ 0.009
σ (In-partisan) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.006
σ (Out-partisan) 0.000 0.000
Observations 19,326
States 51
Note: Parameters were estimated via full maximum likelihood with 2008 as the baseline year.
† Standardized to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
c Conditional relationship; see marginal effects plots.
∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗∗ p<0.001
retrospective item.15 For in-partisans during 2008 in states with no net change in economic per-
formance, each unit increase in the strength of partisanship was associated with about 0.07-point
more favorable prospective economic evaluation. For out-partisans during 2008 in states with no
15Note that the retrospective item modeled in Table 3.1 was a five-point ordinal scale with the neutral category
coded as three.
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Figure 3.7. Marginal Effects of Partisanship on Prospective Economic Perceptions,
by Net Changes in State Unemployment
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
Ef
fe
ct
 o
f P
ar
tis
an
sh
ip
 o
n 
Pr
os
pe
ct
ive
 E
va
lu
at
io
ns
-2 0 2 4 6
D State Unemployment
In-partisans
 
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
 
-2 0 2 4 6
D State Unemployment
Out-partisans
 
Notes: Marginal effects were postestimated from the model shown in Table 3.2; dashed lines indicate the 95%
confidence interval.
change in economic performance, each unit-increase in the strength of partisanship was associated
with about a 0.04-point more favorable prospective economic evaluation. While this latter result
is somewhat surprising, since out-partisans can be expected to view the economy unfavorably in
general, it should be interpretted with caution as it represents a conditional relationship. Looking
at the random effects portion of the model shown in Table 3.2, the results indicate that the intercept
had a statistically significant standard deviation across states of about 0.03 points on the three-point
scale of prospective evaluations. The random effects also show that the coefficient for in-partisan
strength had a standard deviation across states of about 0.01, and once again the coefficient for
out-partisan strength did not vary significantly across states.
Turning to the interaction effects from the model in Table 3.2, marginal effects plots similar
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to those shown previously are shown in Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9. Figure 3.8 plots the marginal
effects of partisanship on prospective economic evaluations across the range of net changes in state
unemployment rates. The results in the left panel of the figure are very similar to the retrospec-
tive model shown above. For in-partisans in states with two-percentage point decreases in state
unemployment rates, each unit increase in the strength of partisanship is associated with about a
0.10 more favorable prospective economic evaluation. This effect again drops off as net changes
in unemployment increase. For in-partisans in states with three-percentage point increases in un-
employment or higher, this effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero. These results are
very similar to those from the retrospective model, as the effect of in-party identities on economic
perceptions is weakened as state unemployment rates rise.
The right panel of Figure 3.8 plots the effect of out-party identities on prospective economic
evaluations across the range of net changes in state unemployment rates. The results show no
statistically different effect sizes across the range of changes in unemployment – the marginal
effect of out-partisan strength on economic perceptions remains almost exactly the same between
respondents in states with the lowest and the highest changes in unemployment rates. Again,
these results suggest a stronger moderating role of net changes in state unemployment rates for
in-partisans than for out-partisans.
Figure 3.9 plots the effects of each partisanship measure on prospective evaluations across
the observed range of percent changes in per capita disposable income. The left panel shows that
for in-partisans in states with the lowest observed changes in per capita disposable income, each
unit increase in partisan strength had a marginal effect of about 0.15 on the three-point scale of
prospective economic evaluations. Surprisingly, this effect dropped off gradually as unemploy-
ment increased, and became statistically indistinguishable from zero in states 2% or higher in-
creases in income. This interesting because while increases in unemployment indicate a declining
economy, increases in income indicate exactly the opposite. However, the change in these effect
sizes between states with the lowest and highest observed changes per capita disposable income
was almost indistinguishable from zero when looking at the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.8. Marginal Effects of Partisanship on Prospective Economic Perceptions,
by Changes in State PCDI
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Notes: Marginal effects were postestimated from the model shown in Table 3.2; dashed lines indicate the 95%
confidence interval.
Finally, the right panel of Figure 3.8 plots the marginal effect of out-partisan strength on
prospective economic evaluations across the range of percent changes in per capita disposable
income. The results look almost identical to those for in-partisans shown in the left panel of the
figure, but once again the difference in these results for out-partisans in states with the lowest and
highest observed changes in income is almost indistinguishable from zero. These results once
again confirm that per capita disposable income is a less useful measure of state-level economic
performance than net changes in state unemployment rates.
As a robustness check, the models from Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 were replicated using pres-
idential approval as the primary individual-level variable in place of partisanship (while including
partisanship as a control). The results were mostly identical to those presented in this chapter and
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can be found in the Appendix.
3.5 Conclusions
Overall, the results from this chapter’s analysis demonstrate that changes in state-level eco-
nomic performance, when measured in terms of unemployment, moderate the relationship between
partisanship and economic perceptions for in-partisans but to a lesser extent for out-partisans.
Twelve-month net changes in state unemployment rates seem to serve as a more reliable indicator
of state-level economic performance than percent changes in per capita disposable income, since
the latter tends to vary across survey years with inflation and across states with the cost of liv-
ing. The findings demonstrate that in-partisans experience ambivalence in contexts of declining
economic performance, thus losing confidence in partisanship as a heuristic for evaluating the na-
tional economy. Out-partisans, on the other hand, respond much less strongly to changes in their
state’s economic performance as they are more likely to rely on partisanship when evaluating the
national economy. These findings apply both to retrospective and prospective evaluations of the
national economy.
The following chapter expands on this analysis by focusing on economic performance at
the county-level during years before, during, and after the recent Great Recession. The following
analysis also goes on to test how this moderating influence of the local economy might also vary
with levels of political knowledge. For example, do citizens require a certain amount of informa-
tion in order to respond to changes in their local economy when asked to evaluate the national
economy?
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CHAPTER 4
COUNTY-LEVEL ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, AND
PARTISAN MOTIVATIONS IN NATIONAL ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS
In the previous chapter I demonstrated that the motivated reasoning of in-partisans when
evaluating the national economy is weakened as state-level economic performance deteriorates.
Out-partisans, being more prone to motivated reasoning, were less likely to be influenced by
changes in the state economy. The state economy represented an ideal middle ground between
the pocketbook and sociotropic theories of how citizens form perceptions of the economy. But
how does more localized performance shape how partisans evaluate the national economy? Even
within a single state, economic performance tends to vary rather dramatically across local commu-
nities. For example, do strawberry pickers in Santa Cruz County, CA base their economic opinions
on the same local economy as a construction worker in Los Angeles County, CA? Should we ex-
pect a small business owner in Dallas, TX to benchmark their economic assessments on the same
environment as an oil rig worker in Houston? And should these contextual effects vary with an
individual’s level of political knowledge? This chapter has two primary purposes. First, the follow-
ing stuty investigates how economic performance below the state-level moderates the motivation
for partisans to view the national economy in terms of their on political identities. Second, this
chapter examines how the tendency for voters to benchmark their national economic assessments
on the local economy might vary with levels of political knowledge. In other words, Chapter 3
established that the state economy matters for how voters perceive the national economy – but
do these contextual effects extend to the local level and, if so, do those effects apply unevenly to
citizens with different levels of political knowledge?
It is an established fact that subjective characteristics of individuals help explain variation
in national economic perceptions (Duch, Palmer & Anderson 2000). To this point, this study
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has demonstrated that these variations in economic assessments are, at least to some degree, also
shaped by the economic environment in which partisans exist. This tendency echoes previous argu-
ments for contextual effects on opinion formation (Przeworski 1974, Weatherford 1983), but defin-
ing such an environment presents important theoretical and methodological difficulties to the point
that almost any measure of the local economic context is imperfect. My goal for Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4 of this study is to untangle some of these complexities by defining the economic envi-
ronment at multiple levels. The previous chapter established that variation in state-level economic
performance, at least in terms of unemployment, shapes the tendency for in-party cues to serve as
a shortcut for evaluating the national economy. As the state economy deteriorates, signals between
an in-partisan’s political identity and signals from the state economy reduce confidence in party
cues when assessing national economic information. Out-partisans are more likely to rely on parti-
san motivations regardless of changes in the state economy. First, being on the ‘losing’ team, out-
partisans display a greater tendency toward motivated reasoning in that they feel a stronger need
to defend their own beliefs. Second, even when economic and political signals conflict for out-
partisans (i.e., an out-partisan in a prosperous environment), positive information stemming from
the economic context exerts a weaker influence on opinion formation than negative information
(Baumeister et al. 2001, Hetherington 1996, Soroka 2006, Taylor 1991). As such, the subjective
influences of partisanship are more likely to shape how out-partisans evaluate the national economy
independently of changes in the state economy. This chapter takes on the arduous task of moving
the local environment closer to the individual voter. If economic environments are thought of as
a range from the voter’s own pocketbook to the objective performance of the national economy
as a whole, a study of contextual effects must identify points somewhere between these two distal
extremes that defines a distinct and measurable economic context. Neither of these extremes are
adequate for understanding variation in national economic perceptions – evidence for pocketbook
origins of economic opinions has been scarce (Books & Prysby 1999, Kinder & Kiewiet 1979),
and objective performance at the national-level represents a constant that inherently cannot explain
why voters view the same macroeconomic realities differently (Kramer 1983, Weatherford 1983).
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The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 describes contextual variation
in economic performance within states. These variations are what drive the analysis in this chapter
– just as national economic indicators fail to capture variation in state-level performance, state-
level indicators fail to capture the substantial variation in performance across local communities.
Section 4.2 describes the data and methodological approaches used to test the role of county-level
economic performance for how partisans benchmark national economic assessments. Section 4.3
presents the analysis and findings, and Section 4.4 concludes with a discussion of the findings and
their implications for the study of economic voting and public opinion.
4.1 Bringing the Context Closer to Home
To very briefly review what the field has already established, we know that citizens tend
to process economic information in ways that confirm their prior political beliefs (Bartels 2002,
Evans & Anderson 2006, Evans & Pickup 2010, Gerber & Huber 2010, Wlezien, Franklin &
Twiggs 1997). These findings stem from psychological research on motivated reasoning, which
demonstrate that citizens tend to process information in belief-confirming ways while rejecting
belief-inconsistent information (Kunda 1990, Lodge & Taber 2013, Lord, Ross & Lepper 1979).
This motivation for belief-preservation has been shown to diminish when economic and political
signals conflict with one another (Basinger & Lavine 2005, Lavine 1998, Lavine, Johnston &
Steenbergen 2012). When signals come into conflict, partisanship becomes less useful as a shortcut
for processing information in self-confirming ways. Only recently has this ‘conditional’ theory of
motivated reasoning been extended to the study of economic voting. Evaluations of economic
performance are more likely to have an exogenous influence on political attitudes as the macro
economy deteriorates (Chzhen, Evans & Pickup 2014, Dickerson 2015), and partisans begin to
converge in how they perceive national economic realities (Parker-Stephen 2013).1 These findings
suggest that more than just individual characteristics play a role in how voters evaluate the national
1However, there is evidence that when in-partisans and out-partisans diverge in how they view the economy, they
simultaneously diverge in how they attribute responsibility for economic performance (Bisgaard 2015). This suggests
that even if evidence of partisan motivated reasoning seems to vanish from how voters evaluate the economy, those
motivations still tend to manifest themselves in other ways.
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economy.
The next step in this line of research is to utilize objective economic information in or-
der to better understand how economic performance moderates partisan bias in national economic
perceptions. As stated previously, any definition of the local economic environment is imperfect.
Variation in economic performance exists over time as well as across regions, states, counties,
and local communities. The closer the environment is to home, the more likely it becomes that
an individual directly experiences the economy. But defining too small of an environment – for
example, one’s own pocketbook or household income – leads to an overestimation of the homo-
geneity within groups while underestimating subjective variation across individuals. This debate
over how to define the economic environment is not new to the field, although studies of economic
contextual effects have been few and far between. In one of the earliest calls for contextual effects
on econonmic evaluations, Weatherford argues that:
“Context has an impact on individual opinions because there exists a fairly clear bias
of sentiment in the area, and because this majority opinion exercises some pressure
toward conformity. Specifying too large a geographic area will miss the element of
similar experience that leads to a ‘climate of opinion,’ while too small an area will
overestimate the degree of homogeneity occuring naturally in the individual’s envi-
ronment.” (Weatherford 1983, pp. 871)
The handful of studies which have taken the local economic context into account have de-
fined the environment in several different ways including metropolitan Labor Market Areas (LMA)
(Books & Prysby 1999, Weatherford 1983), state-level unemployment (Abrams & Butkiewicz
1995, Ansolabehere, Meredith & Snowberg 2014, Books & Prysby 1999, Brunk & Gough 1983),
and groups of politically and demographically distinct counties (Reeves & Gimpel 2012). Ob-
viously, voters probably do not experience any one of these economic environments exclusively.
People commute across county lines for work or social interaction, exposing themselves to eco-
nomic signals that might fall outside of their ‘home’ environment. Moreover, state-level economic
policy tends to produce economic effects that spillover across communities within the state. On the
other hand, defining the economic environment at the state-level fails to capture substantial varia-
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Figure 4.1. Unemployment Rates by County, 2009
Notes: Unemployment data were obtained through the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov).
tion across communities that undoubtedly exist, particularly in geographically larger states. Even
in the midst of a major national recession, localities differ in the extent to which they are impacted
by the crisis. For example, Figure 4.1 shows levels of unemployment across counties following the
Great Recession. It is clear that a great deal of variation exists in economic performance below the
state-level, particularly in geographically larger states such as Texas and California.
To better illustrate contextual variation in economic performance below the state-level, Fig-
79
Figure 4.2. Unemployment Rates by Texas Counties, 2009
Notes: Unemployment data were obtained through the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov).
ure 4.2 focuses on county-level unemployment rates in the state of Texas following the Great Re-
cession. Significant contextual variation in unemployment rates within the state of Texas show that,
just as a national economic indicator fails to capture economic variation across states, a state-level
economic indicator similarly fails to capture variation in economic performance across counties.
For example, Throckmorton County, TX had an unemployment rate of less than 2% in 2009. But
only a short drive north to Baylor county or south to Shackelford county leads to unemployment
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rates of higher than 10%. This suggests that some localities were hurt more by the recession than
others, and it begs the question – how more or less likely were partisans in Throckmorton County to
view the economy through a partisan lens than partisans in Baylor County or Shackelford County?
Past research suggests that in-partisans (Democratic identifiers in 2009) should view the economy
favorably, while out-partisans (Republicans in 2009) should view the economy unfavorably. The
previous chapter suggested that in a state with rising unemployment, these differences in economic
opinions may diminish. But on a more localized level, should partisans in Throckmorton County
benchmark their national economic assessments differently than partisans in Baylor County?
It is worth noting that these local variations in unemployment can be misleading – spillover
effects from state policies and cross-county commuters make measuring the context at the local
level much more cumbersome. It could be the case that residents of Throckmorton County com-
mute to either Baylor County or Shackelford County for employment, or vice versa. Citizens do
not directly experience a conscious change in the economic environment when crossing county
lines. The implication is that even county-level economic indicators are imperfect measures of the
local economy. But despite these jurisdictional spillover effects, the significance of the results that
follow can be interpretted as attenuated estimates of the influence of the local economy on how
partisans benchmark national economic assessments.
4.2 Theoretical Expectations
Similar to previous chapters, I start with the assumption that the tendency toward motivated
reasoning is asymmetrically stronger for out-partisans than in-partisans (Ditto et al. 1998, Goren,
Federico & Kittilson 2009). Through a sort of cognitive defense mechanism, out-group members
feel stronger motivations to protect and defend their prior beliefs than in-group members. Second,
I assume that a negative information environment is more influential for opinion formation than a
positive information environment (Baumeister et al. 2001, Hetherington 1996, Soroka 2006, Taylor
1991). Given these two assumptions, consider four partisans in distinct economic environments:
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an in-partisan in poor conditions; an in-partisan in prosperous conditions; an out-partisan in poor
conditions; and an out-partisan in prosperous conditions. First, an in-partisan surrounded by poor
economic conditions experiences conflicting signals – a personal identity with the incumbent pres-
idential party and negative economic signals from the local environment. The resulting ambiva-
lence, combined with the asymmetrically stronger influence of negative information over positive
information, reduces confidence in partisanship when it comes to evaluating the national economy.
For an in-partisan surrounded by more prosperous conditions, these signals fall back into sync with
one another and the influence of partisanship on economic perceptions returns. For an out-partisan
surrounded by poor conditions, partisan identities and economic signals are congruent with one
another and so the effect of partisanship on economic perceptions remains unchanged. Finally, for
an out-partisan surrounded by prosperous conditions (which are conflicting signals), the influence
of partisanship still remains. This latter tendency should result from the fact that out-group mem-
bers are more prone to motivated reasoning and positive information (coming from the prosperous
local economy) is less influential for opinion formation than negative information. The observable
implications of these expectations should be an asymmetrical influence of the local economy on
how in-partisans and out-partisans come to view the national economy – local conditions should
moderate the influence of partisanship on national economic evaluations for in-partisans, but less
so for out-partisans.
I propose the following hypotheses. First, in-partisans in counties with poor economic per-
formance should become less likely to view the economy in terms of their own partisanship. Con-
flicting signals between in-party identities and negative information stemming from the local econ-
omy should reduce confidence in party cues when evaluating the economy. Second, out-partisans
should be less likely to benchmark national economic assessments on changes in the local econ-
omy. It has already been established that out-group members, being on the ‘losing team’ are subject
to stronger motivations to defend their prior beliefs (Ditto & Lopez 1992, Ditto et al. 1998, Goren,
Federico & Kittilson 2009). Moreover, even an out-partisan exposed to conflicting political and
economic signals (i.e., an out-partisan in a county with good economic performance) should be
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less likely to dismiss party cues when evaluating the national economy due to the asymmetrically
weaker influence of positive information (stemming from the local economy) over negative in-
formation. Third, I expect individuals with higher levels of knowledge to weigh their partisanship
more heavily than information from the local economy, since the most knowledgeable citizens tend
to also be the most prone to motivated reasoning. In other words, any moderating role of the local
economy should diminish as levels of political knowledge increase.
It is worth noting that most citizens probably do not possess specific knowledge about
county-level economic performance. As stated in the previous chapter, voters tend to be more
heavily exposed to information regarding the national economy than the local economy, and that
information has been shown to impact how voters evaluate the national economy (Baumeister
et al. 2001, Goidel & Langley 1995, Harrington 1989, Hetherington 1996, Sanders & Gavin 2004,
Soroka 2006, Taylor 1991). While the purpose of this study is to investigate the moderating role
of the local economy for national economic perceptions, the influence of national economic infor-
mation should not be discounted. Unfortunately, with only one set of survey observations per year,
national-level economic indicators are of little use in explaining variation in economic perceptions.
The following analysis accounts for these unmeasured influences by including dummy variables
for survey years, with 2008 excluded as the baseline year. The following section elaborates on the
nested data structure and model specification in greater detail. Nonetheless, voters do not need
to possess specific knowledge about the local economy in order to experience some contextual
influence – it has already been established that voters tend to form opinions that reflect the circum-
stances of other voters in similar social, economic, and political contexts (Ansolabehere, Meredith
& Snowberg 2014, Przeworski 1974, Weatherford 1983), even without possessing specific knowl-
edge about the local context.
4.3 Data Structure and Model Specification
I test this theory using a multilevel analysis, in which survey respondents are nested within
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counties and states.2 Data for the following analysis come from the 2006-2012 Cooperative Con-
gressional Election Studies (CCES), supplemented with county- and state-level unemployment
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The CCES survey data are useful for this study
for a number of reasons. First, the studies’ Common Content sections provide a strong degree of
consistency in survey content and question wording unmatched by many public opinion surveys.
Second, each survey year consists of sample sizes that far surpass those offered by even the most
popular public opinion surveys (approximately 200,000 individual respondents across the seven
surveys). Obviously, a sample size of this magnitude is far from necessary for any standard sta-
tistical analysis. The benefit of this sample size is the variation it provides within groups – in this
case, at the county and state levels. Over the course of the seven survey years, respondents were
interviewed in 3,017 counties and all 50 states plus Washington D.C. The number of respondents
per county ranged from 1 to 5,102, and the number of respondents per state ranged from 421 to
21,526.3 These level-two and level-three sample sizes allow for a multilevel analysis capable of
testing the theoretical expectations described above.
The first level of the nested data structure consists of the pooled sample of CCES survey
respondents from 2006 through 2012. The dependent variable (Econi jk) is a five-point ordinal mea-
sure of retrospective evaluations of the national economy ranging from “much worse” to “much
better”.4 The primary first-level predictors are measures of the strength of identification with the
in-party and out-party, measured relative to the party of the current president in each survey year.
In order to form these two measures, the traditional seven-point party identification scale was re-
coded in each survey year to range from -3 (strong out-partisans) to 3 (strong in-partisans), with
pure independents centered at zero. To better capture asymmetries between in-partisans and out-
partisans, this measure was then split into a measure of in-party strength (coded as 0 for pure
2Survey respondents represent the first level, counties represent the second level, and states represent the third
level.
3Note that dropping groups with less than some threshold sample size is not useful in this case, since doing so
would eliminate variation in economic performance across counties while also affecting the distribution of survey
responses. Multilevel modeling approaches allow for vast differences in sample sizes within groups.
4Specifically: 1) “much worse”; 2) “somewhat worse”; 3) “about the same”; 4) “somewhat better”; 5) “much
better”. Since items measuring prospective evaluations of the national economy were not included consistently across
the CCES surveys, this chapter relies exclusively on retrospective evaluations.
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independents and all out-partisans, 1 for in-partisan leaners, 2 for weak in-partisans, and 3 for
strong in-partisans) and out-party strength (coded as 0 for pure independents and all in-partisans,
1 for out-partisan leaners, 2 for weak out-partisans, and 3 for strong out-partisans). The benefit
of splitting partisanship into separate measures for in-partisans and out-partisans is that it allows
for different effect sizes for the two groups. The traditional seven-point scale, whether ranging
from Democrat to Republican or from out-partisan to in-partisan, fails to capture in-group and out-
group asymmetries. Other first-level control variables include employment status (coded one for
unemployed and zero for employed, retired, or disabled), ideological self-placement, presidential
approval, educational attainment, race, gender, and age. All question wordings and variable cod-
ings can be found in the Appendix for this chapter. Age, ideological self-placement, presidential
approval, and educational attainment are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard devi-
ation of one in order to better facilitate interpretation of the intercepts and random effects, which
are described in greater detail in the following section.
The primary second-level predictor is a measure of twelve-month net changes in county-
level unemployment rates, measured from November of the previous year to November of each
survey year.5 I also control for county populations (logged), since unemployment rates rural and
urban areas reflect very different environments. The resulting data structure consists of 192,812
survey respondents nested within 2,936 counties and 50 states plus the District of Columbia over
the course of seven survey years.6 On the state-level, I also control for twelve-month net changes
in state unemployment rates.7
The distributions of twelve-month net changes in county and state unemployment rates are
shown in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, respectively. For the entire pooled sample, net changes in
5Based on the null findings for a conditional influence of per capita disposable income in the previous chapter,
income is excluded from the following analysis. Since income tends to vary geographically with the cost-of-living and
temporally with inflation, it is a less effective measure of local economic performance than net changes in unemploy-
ment rates. Moreover, income data were not available for every county included in the sample, and dropping those
counties would alter the distribution of individual-level survey responses.
6Sample sizes are expressed after listwise deletion of missing survey responses.
7Since the previous chapter established that changes in state unemployment rates shape how partisans view the
economy, the following models would suffer from omitted variable bias by not at least including a control for net
changes in state unemployment.
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Figure 4.3. Kernel Density Plot of 12-Month Net Changes in County-Level Employment Rates
county-level unemployment ranged from -14.3 to 14.0 with a mean 0.07 and a standard deviation
of 1.45. State-level unemployment ranged from -5.3 to 4.5 with a mean of 0.03 and a standard
deviation of 1.36.
To test the hypotheses described above, I estimate a three-level model of economic percep-
tions as a function of partisanship, net changes in county unemployment rates, and net changes
in state unemployment rates. The subscripts i, j, and k denote individuals nested within counties
nested within states, respectively. The benefits of a multilevel analysis are that intercepts and ef-
fect sizes on the individual-level are allowed to vary with changes in predictors at the second level.
Equation 4.1 illustrates the multilevel model specification, where Tt is a vector of year dummies
(with 2008 as the baseline year).8 Substantively, the nested data structure allows the effects of
8Dummy variables for survey years are included to capture unobserved factors that vary across years, such as the
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Figure 4.4. Kernel Density Plot of 12-Month Net Changes in State-Level Employment Rates
partisanship on economic perceptions to vary with net changes in county unemployment rates. Ex-
pressed in mixed effects form, the model includes cross-level interactions for both in-partisans and
out-partisans with each of the county- and state-level economic indicators. The model is estimated
in the following section in mixed effects form via full maximum likelihood.
I estimate cross-level interaction effects where each partisanship measure is interacted with
net changes in county unemployment rates. I also include random intercepts at the county-level
and the state-level, using net changes in unemployment rates at each level as predictors. To capture
the influence of the national economic context on economic perceptions, I also include year-fixed
effects to allow the intercept to vary across surveys. Unfortunately including an objective indicator
performance of the national economy. Since only one survey observation exists per survey year, national economic
performance lacks the variation to be explicitly modeled – but the survey year dummy variables should absorb any
outside influence of the national economy on economic perceptions.
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of the national economy isn’t feasible since only one survey is conducted per year. Thus, only a
single national-level observation would be present for each survey year.
The three-level model can be expressed in hierarchical form as follows (with socio-demographic
controls omitted for space purposes):
Individual Econi jk = pi0 jk+pi1 jkInptyi jk+pi2 jkOutptyi jk+
T−1
∑
t=1
Tt + ei jk
County pi0 jk = β00k+β01kUnemp0 jk+ r0 jk
pi1 jk = β10k+β11kUnemp1 jk+ r1 jk
pi2 jk = β20k+β21kUnemp2 jk+ r2 jk
State β00k = γ000 + γ001Unemp0k+ v00k
(4.1)
In the second part of the following analysis, I expand on the model described in Equa-
tion 4.1 to also include three-way interactions between partisanship, educational attainment (stan-
dardized), and net changes in county unemployment rates. The three-way interaction is meant
to capture the extent to which a moderating influence of local economic performance on partisan
biases in economic perceptions might vary with an individual’s level of political knowledge. As
should be standard practice for models including multiplicative interactions, this expanded model
includes each component term of the three-way interaction, as well as each component two-way
interaction (Berry, DeMeritt & Esarey 2010, Berry, Golder & Milton 2012, Brambor, Clark &
Golder 2006, Clark, Gilligan & Golder 2006). The full interactive model also includes random
intercepts at the state-level, as well as random intercepts and random effects at the county-level.9
4.4 Analysis
Mixed effects estimates of economic perceptions as a function of partisanship and local
9The full interactive model includes county-level random effects for in-partisan strength, out-partisan strength, and
political knowledge.
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economic performance are shown in Table 4.1. With 2008 treated as the baseline survey year, the
intercept represents the grand mean economic perception (γ000 in Equation 4.1) for pure indepen-
dents in 2008 who were currently employed and held average ideologies, education, and presiden-
tial approval ratings.10 The positive and statistically significant coefficients for each survey year
show that economic perceptions on average were the least favorable during 2008. The intercept
shows that during 2008, on average, a pure independent in a county and state with no net change in
unemployment had an average economic perception of about 1.7 on the five-point scale. This isn’t
necessarily surprising, however, since the 2008 survey was conducted immediately after the onset
of the financial crisis. The random intercept estimates shown in the bottom half of Table 4.1 show
that this grand mean economic perception had a standard deviation of about 0.02 across counties
(r0 jk) and about 0.03 across states (v00k). This suggests that perceptions of the national economy
varied systematically across contexts and, while those variations were small in magnitude, they
were significantly different from zero. Figure 4.5 plots the distributions of intercepts across coun-
ties and states, respectively, based on 1,000 Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations of
the model shown in Table 4.1.11 Note that similar to the results shown in Chapter 3, the intercept
only represents the average economic perception of the baseline group (pure independents) during
the baseline survey year (the 2008 CCES).
Looking at the main effects estimates for in-partisan strength and out-partisan strength, the
results in Table 4.1 show that (assuming no net change in county or state unemployment rates) eco-
nomic perceptions became about 0.06 points more favorable with each unit increase in the strength
of identification with the incumbent president, and about 0.05 less favorable with each unit increase
in the strength of identification with the out-party. The main effects coefficients also suggest that
for pure independents, a one-point increase in state-level unemployment rates was associated with
about only a 0.003-point less favorable economic perception, and a one-point increase in county-
10Assuming no net change in county or state unemployment rates; note that ideology, education, age, and presiden-
tial approval are each standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, and employment status is
coded as zero for individuals who are currently employed. Standardizing these variables simply makes the intercepts
and random effects estimates easier to interpret.
11Simulations are based on maximum a posterior probability estimation (Gelman & Hill 2007, Gelman & Su 2015).
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Table 4.1. Mixed Effects Estimates of Economic Perceptions as a Function of Partisanship and
Local Economic Performance, with Year Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects Estimate Robust SE
In-partisan 0.063c 0.003
Out-partisan −0.050c 0.003
∆ St. employment −0.003 0.007
∆ Co. employment 0.035c 0.005
∆ Co. employment*In-partisan −0.080c 0.005
∆ Co. employment*Out-partisan 0.038c 0.002
County population (logged) 0.008∗∗ 0.003
Education 0.047∗∗∗ 0.002
Ideology 0.045∗∗∗ 0.005
Presidential approval 0.584∗∗∗ 0.005
Employment status −0.177∗∗∗ 0.007
2006 1.353∗∗∗ 0.024
2007 0.909∗∗∗ 0.027
2009 2.34∗∗∗ 0.021
2010 0.768∗∗∗ 0.017
2011 0.662∗∗∗ 0.021
2012 0.965∗∗∗ 0.021
Intercept 1.684∗∗∗ 0.026
County Random Effects Std. Deviation Robust SE
σ (intercept) 0.020∗∗∗ 0.006
σ (in-partisan) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.003
σ (out-partisan) 0.022∗∗∗ 0.003
State Random Effects Std. Deviation Robust SE
σ (intercept) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.005
Observations 193,628
Counties 2,980
States 51
Note: Parameters were estimated via full maximum likelihood with 2008 as the baseline year.
∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗∗ p<0.001
c Conditional relationship; see marginal effects plots.
level unemployment rates was associated with about a 0.04-point more favorable economic percep-
tion. However, given the interactive nature of the model, these coefficients should be interpretted
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Figure 4.5. Simulated County- and State-Level Random Intercepts
Notes: Intercepts indicate the expected economic perception of currently employed pure independents with average
approval ratings and ideologies in 2008 (the baseline year).
with caution as they represent conditional relationships. More substantively interesting are the in-
teractions between partisanship and net changes in county unemployment rates. Before examining
the cross-level interactions, it is useful to examine the random effects at both the county and state
levels. On the county-level, the random effects show that the impact of in-party identification on
national economic perceptions had a standard deviation of about 0.03 across counties, while the
impact of out-party identifications had a standard deviation of about 0.02 across counties. While
the random intercepts described above demonstrate variation in mean economic perceptions across
contexts, the random effects estimates for in-party strength and out-party strength show how the
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relationship between partisanship and economic perceptions varies across contexts.
The more substantively interesting findings are the estimates for the cross-level interactions
between partisanship and each of the county- and state-level economic indicators. The coefficients
and significance levels for these interactions should be interpretted with caution, as they represent
conditional relationships. A more suitable approach to interpretting these relationships is to com-
pute the marginal effects of each measure of partisanship on economic perceptions across the full
range of each of the economic indicators.12
These marginal effects are plotted in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7. Looking first at Figure 4.6,
the left panel plots the marginal effect of each one-unit shift in the strength of identification with
the incumbent party on economic perceptions across the full range of twelve-month net changes in
county unemployment rates. For an in-partisan in a county with about a 14-point decrease in un-
employment (a very prosperous local economy), each unit increase in the strength of partisanship
was associated with about a 1.25-point more favorable economic perception.13 An in-partisan in a
county with such a drastically declining unemployment rate is exposed to congruent political and
economic signals – she feels favorably towards the incumbent political party and is surrounded
by positive economic signals. This effect becomes weaker as net decreases in unemployment ap-
proach zero – for an in-partisan in a county with no net change in unemployment, each unit shift
in the strength of partisanship was associated with about a 0.25-point more favorablel economic
perception. This positive effect given no net change in unemployment isn’t particularly suprising,
however, since we can naturally expect in-partisans to view the economy more favorably than out-
12Based on the model expressed in Equation 4.1, marginal effects can be computed for in-partisans as:
δY
δX
= β10k+β11kUnemp jk (4.2)
and for out-partisans as:
δY
δX
= β20k+β21kUnemp jk (4.3)
13Note that a county with a 14-point increase or decrease in unemployment is an outlier. However, dropping
observations from these outlier counties did not substantively change the results, so those counties were retained
here for the purposes of maintaining a good degree of variation in county-level economic performance. Moreover,
dropping outlying counties alters the distribution of the individual-level data.
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Figure 4.6. Marginal Effects of Partisanship on Economic Perceptions across Net Changes in
County Unemployment
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Notes: Marginal effects are in comparison to the baseline group (pure independents) across the full range of
twelve-month net changes in county unemployment rates; dashed lines indicate the upper and lower bounds of the
95% confidence interval.
partisans. As unemployment rates begin to rise, the effect of identifying with the incumbent party
on economic perceptions crosses zero and becomes negative. For an in-partisan in a county with
the highest observed net increase in unemployment, each unit shift in the strength of partisanship
is associated with about a one-point less favorable economic perception. This supports the hy-
pothesis that an in-partisan in a poor economic environment becomes less strongly motivated to
view the economy in terms of political identities. Conflicting signals between the local economy
and the individual’s partisan leaning reduces confidence in partisanship as a cue for evaluating
the economy. Comparing in-partisans in counties with the highest decreases and highest increases
in unemployment, the effect of in-party strength on economic perceptions changed by about 2.5
points on the five-point scale of economic perceptions.
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Figure 4.7. Marginal Effects of Net Changes in County Unemployment on Economic Perceptions
across Partisan Strength
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Notes: Marginal effect represent the expected change in economic perception based on a one-point net change in
unemployment across the range of each partisanship measure; dashed lines indicate the upper and lower bounds of
the 95% confidence interval.
The right panel of Figure 4.6 similarly plots the effects of out-party strength on economic
perceptions across the full range of net changes in county unemployment rates. For an out-partisan
in a county with the highest decrease in unemployment, each unit shift in the strength of identifi-
cation with the out-party is associated with about a 0.5-point less favorable economic perception.
This falls in line with the hypothesis that since negative signals are more influential for opinion
formation than positive signals, and since out-partisans are more prone to motivated reasoning
than in-partisans, an out-partisan in a positive economic environment should still be likely to rely
on their partisanship as a cue for evaluating the national economy. As net changes in unemploy-
ment approach zero, so too does the effect of out-party strength on economic perceptions. For an
out-partisan in a county with no net change in unemployment, the effect of partisanship on eco-
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nomic perceptions is slightly negative but almost indistinguishable from zero. As unemployment
rates increase, the effect of out-party strength surprisingly becomes positive, but remains relatively
weak on the five-point scale of economic perceptions. For an out-partisan in a county with the
highest observed increase in unemployment rates, each unit shift in the strength of partisanship is
surprisingly associated with about a 0.5-point more favorable economic perception. Comparing
out-partisans in counties with the highest decreases and highest increases in unemployment, the
effect of out-party strength on economic perception change by only about one point on the five-
point scale of economic perceptions (compared to 2.5 points for in-partisans). This suggests that
in-partisans respond to changes in the local economy more strongly than out-partisans.
When investigating conditional relationships, it is useful to also examine the effect of the
moderator variable (in this case, net changes in county unemployment rates) on the outcome across
the range of the predictor variable (in this case, in-partisan strength and out-partisan strength).
Thus, while Figure 4.6 plotted the effect of partisanship on economic perceptions across changes
in unemployment, Figure 4.7 plots the effect of changes in unemployment on economic perceptions
across the range of in-party strength (left panel) and out-party strength (right panel). The purpose
of this figure is to better illustrate differences in how in-partisans and out-partisans respond to
changes in the local economy. Looking first at the left panel, increases in county unemployment
rates have a negative effect on economic perceptions, which becomes stronger with the strength of
identification with the incumbent party. For pure independents, the effect of changes in unemploy-
ment on economic perceptions was indistinguishable from zero. For in-party leaners, increases
in unemployment were associated with about a 0.1-point less favorable economic perception; for
weak in-partisans, increases in unemployment were associated with about a 0.15-point less favor-
able economic perception; and for strong in-partisans, increases in unemployment were associated
with about a 2.5-point less favorable economic perception. This lends more support to the expec-
tation that in-partisans become less likely to view the economy in light of their party identification
when surrounded by deteriorating economic conditions.
The right panel of Figure 4.7 similarly plots the effect of rising unemployment on economic
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perceptions across the strength of identification with the out-party. Surprisingly, out-partisans seem
to view the economy more favorably as county unemployment rates rise, although these effects are
again weak relative to the five-point scale of economic perceptions. Increases in county unemploy-
ment rates lead to only about a 0.25-point more favorable economic perception for out-partisan
leaners; about 0.5-points more favorable for weak out-partisans; and about one-point more favor-
able for strong out-partisans. While it is surprising that out-partisans seem to view the national
economy more favorably as their local economy deteriorates, these effects are very small in mag-
nitude.
4.4.1 Political Knowledge and the Local Economy
Another goal of this chapter is to investigate the role that knowledge plays in how voters
benchmark their economic assessments based on the local economy. Does the extent to which the
local economy moderates partisan motivations vary with levels of knowledge? Chapter 2 estab-
lished that the motivation to preserve prior beliefs when evaluating the national economy became
stronger with increasing levels of political knowledge, particularly for in-partisans. More knowl-
edgeable citizens are better able to manipulate and counterargue belief-inconsistent facts than less
knowledgeable citizens. But how does the tendency for voters to base economic opinions on the
performance of the local economy vary with levels of knowledge? Do citizens require some suffi-
cient amount of knowledge or sophistication in order to proper utilize and respond to signals from
the local economy? Or if motivated reasoning is strongest among the most knowledgeable citizens,
then are those same citizens more likely to ignore signals from the local economy and rely instead
strictly on partisanship when evaluating the national economy? The last portion of this analysis
tests the dual influences of local economic signals and political knowledge for how partisans form
their economic perceptions. The results should shed light on how the moderating influence of
the local economy on the motivated reasoning of partisans when evaluating the national economy
might vary with an individual’s level of information.
To this point, the findings presented in this chapter reflect those from the previous chapter
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Table 4.2. Mixed Effects Estimates of Economic Perceptions as a Function of Partisanship, Local
Economic Performance, and Political Knowledge
Fixed Effects Estimate Robust SEa
In-partisan 0.063c 0.003
Out-partisan −0.051c 0.003
Education 0.064c 0.004
∆ St. employment 0.001 0.007
∆ Co. employment 0.030c 0.005
∆ Co. employment*in-partisan −0.081c 0.005
∆ Co. employment*out-partisan 0.038c 0.003
∆ County unemployment*education −0.025c 0.003
∆ County unemployment*education*in-partisan −0.002c 0.002
∆ County unemployment*education*out-partisan 0.001c 0.001
County population (logged) 0.030∗∗∗ 0.005
Ideology 0.047∗∗∗ 0.005
Presidential approval 0.584∗∗∗ 0.004
Employment status −0.176∗∗∗ 0.007
2006 1.356∗∗∗ 0.025
2007 0.906∗∗∗ 0.028
2009 2.332∗∗∗ 0.021
2010 0.770∗∗∗ 0.019
2011 0.677∗∗∗ 0.020
2012 0.977∗∗∗ 0.020
Intercept
County Random Effects Std. Deviation Robust SE
σ (intercept) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.006
σ (in-partisan) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.003
σ (out-partisan) 0.023∗∗∗ 0.003
σ (education) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.006
State Random Effects Std. Deviation Robust SE
σ (intercept) 0.022∗∗∗ 0.005
Observations 193,628
Counties 2,980
States 51
Note: Parameters were estimated via full maximum likelihood with 2008 as the baseline year.
a White-Huber corrected standard errors.
∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗∗ p<0.001
c Conditional relationship.
97
which focused on state-level economic performance. This seems to suggest that partisans respond
similarly to both the county- and state-level economies when evaluating the national economy.
But what role does knowledge play for how partisans benchmark their economic assessments?
This chapter also aims to address the extent to which the local economy moderates partisan biases
in economic perceptions varies based on an individual’s level of political knowledge. Table 4.2
estimates a model similar to that shown in Table 4.1, but differs in that it also includes educational
attainment in the interaction term.14
Before examining the results in Table 4.2, important data limitation issues need to be ad-
dressed. Perhaps one of the ugliest aspects of studying political knowledge lies in its measurement.
In Chapter 2, I constructed reliable measures of political knowledge from survey items included
in the 1988 and 2012 American National Election Studies (ANES). The degree of consistency in
survey content and question wording between these two surveys provided a useful opportunity to
investigate the role of knowledge for the formation of economic perceptions during two distinctly
different time periods. Chapter 3 did not include a measure of knowledge (besides a control for ed-
ucational attainment), due to the lack of consistency across the 1980-2012 ANES studies. Rather,
the purpose of Chapter 3 was to capitalize on the state-level variation in economic performance of-
fered by the pooled survey time series – hence a trade-off between being able to produce adequate
measures of political knowledge and being able to conduct a multilevel analysis of individuals
nested within counties or states. The pooled CCES data used in this chapter poses the same bene-
fits and limitations as the pooled ANES data used in the previous chapter. The CCES data provides
sample sizes within counties and states which allow for an appropriate multilevel analysis, but
they lack the content and consistency needed for construction of a knowledge measure such as
that used in Chapter 2. The only variable used in the CCES surveys which provided any kind of
measure of a respondent’s level of information was educational attainment. Most of the surveys
included a battery of items asking respondents to place various political figures on ideological
scales (similar to those used to construct the knowledge measures in Chapter 2), but the scale of
14Note that education is also standardized in Table 4.2 to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
Doing so facilitates easier interpretation of interaction terms, random intercepts, and random effects.
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those items differed across surveys. Some surveys used 100-point ideological scales, while others
used the ANES 7-point scales. Moreover, each survey different in the content of those batteries
of questions – some included presidential candidates (during the 2008 and 2012 surveys, although
the 2008 survey used a 100-point scale and the 2012 survey used a 7-point scale); some included
the political parties themselves; and some included individual political figures that could not be
compared to another figure.15 One avenue might be to analyze only a single survey year from
the CCES data, constructing a measure of knowledge based on that year’s content. But doing so
restricts the county and state levels from having any temporal variation in economic performance.
Using the 2012 ANES survey would allow the use of the same knowledge measure from Chapter 2,
but poses the same restriction as using a single CCES survey for conducting a multilevel analysis.
Thus, the data used in this project prevent a truely satisfactory multilevel analysis of partisanship,
local economic performance, and an adequate measure of political knowledge.
The simplest available solution, which numerous other scholars have used, is to simply
use educational attainment as a proxy for political knowledge. Scholars disagree over the use
of education as a measure of political knowledge or sophistication, but this study is not meant
as a contribution to the measurement debate. I use educational attainment here as a measure of
knowledge simply due to the data available – constructing a knowledge measure for a single year
prevents an adequately nested data structure, while pooling multiple surveys prevents construction
of an adequate measure of political knowledge.
Turning now to the results in Table 4.2, I estimate three-way interactions between each mea-
sure of partisanship, educational attainment, and net changes in county unemployment rates. Note
that educational attainment is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
The standardized measure ranges from about -1.7 standard deviations below mean education levels
to about 1.6 standard deviations above mean education levels. The model shown here is essentially
the same as that expressed in Equation 4.1 with one additional term added to the interaction. The
15For example, the knowledge measure used in Chapter 2 included items comparing respondents’ ideological place-
ment of presidential candidates, coded as correct if the Republican candidate was placed to the right of the Democratic
candidate. Thus, two comparable items are needed to construct a correct/incorrect measure of knowledge.
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coefficients for the three-way interactions show how, and to what extent, the moderating influence
of the local economy for the relationship between partisanship and economic perceptions varies
based on an individual’s education. In other words, based on the hypotheses described earlier in
this chapter, the moderating effect of the local economy should diminish as levels of knowledge
increase. More highly educated citizens should be better able to systematically counter-argue facts
which contradict their political beliefs. Thus, even if the local economy is performing poorly, a
highly knowledgeable in-partisan can be expected to still evaluate the national economy in terms
of their own political identity. Surprisingly, the results shown in Table 4.2 do not lend support to
this argument. The lack of statistical significance for the three-way interactions suggest that the
moderating effect of the local economy is not significantly different for individuals with high or
low levels of knowledge. But as stated earlier, coefficients of multiplicative interaction terms and
their statistical significance should be interpretted with caution. Separate marginal effects plots for
different levels of educational attainment provides a more intuitive way of assessing the interac-
tive influences of partisanship, education, and county unemployment for how partisans view the
national economy.
In order to better illustrate the findings shown in Table 4.2, the marginal effects of partisan-
ship on economic perceptions across the observed range of county unemployment rates are plotted
for in-partisans and out-partisans in Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9, respectively. In each figure the left
panel plots the marginal effects of partisanship across changes in unemployment for respondents
with one and a half standard deviations below the mean level of educational attainment; the center
panel plots the marginal effects for respondents with mean levels of educational attainment; and
the right panel plots the marginal effects for respondents with one and a half standard deviations
above the mean level of educational attainment. Note again that once standardized, education
ranged from just over one and a half standard deviations below the mean to just over one and a
half standard deviations above the mean. Thus, the 1.5 standard deviation differences shown in
Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 roughly represent the minimum, mean, and maximum levels of educa-
tion among CCES respondents. As suggested by the results shown in Table 4.2, there is essentially
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Figure 4.8. Marginal Effects of In-Partisan Strength on Economic Perceptions across Net Changes
in County Unemployment, by Educational Attainment
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Notes: Marginal effect represent the expected change in economic perception based on a one-point shift in the
strength of identification with the incumbent party across net changes in county unemployment rates; dashed lines
indicate the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval. Note that the standardized measure of
educational attainment ranged from 1.7 standard deviations below the mean to 1.6 standard deviations above the
mean. For simplicity, the plots shown here show 1.5 standard deviations above and below the mean level of education.
no difference in the marginal effects of partisanship across unemployment for different levels of
educational attainment. For in-partisans with all levels of education in counties with about 15%
decreases in unemployment rates (the minimum observed value), each unit increase in the strength
of partisanship had a marginal effect of about 1.25 on retrospective evaluations of the national
economy. This effect dropped off as county unemployment rates increased. For in-partisans across
all education levels in counties with about 15% increases in unemployment (the maximum ob-
served value), each unit increase in the strength of partisanship had a marginal effect of about -1.0
on evaluations of the national economy.
Figure 4.9 similarly plots the effect of out-party identities on economic perceptions across
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Figure 4.9. Marginal Effects of Out-Partisan Strength on Economic Perceptions across Net
Changes in County Unemployment, by Educational Attainment
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Notes: Marginal effect represent the expected change in economic perception based on a one-point shift in the
strength of identification with the out-party across net changes in county unemployment rates; dashed lines indicate
the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval. Note that the standardized measure of educational
attainment ranged from 1.7 standard deviations below the mean to 1.6 standard deviations above the mean. For
simplicity, the plots shown here show 1.5 standard deviations above and below the mean level of education.
the observed range of net changes in county unemployment rates for respondents with low, medium,
and high levels of knowledge. The results are similar to those shown in Figure 4.8, but somewhat
weaker. For out-partisans across all education levels in counties with the lowest observed net
changes in unemployment, each unit increase in the strength of partisanship had a marginal ef-
fect of about -0.50 points on economic perceptions. This effect increased to about 0.50 points for
out-partisans in states with the highest observed net changes in unemployment rates.
There are three possible explanations for this null finding. First, the lack of support for this
chapter’s third hypothesis could simply be an artifact of the data. If a more adequate measure of
political knowledge were available, the results might look different. However, this is less likely
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than the following two explanations. Second, it might be the case that any moderating influence
of the local economy for how partisans evaluate the national economy overrides any moderating
influence of political knowledge. This would suggest that signals from the local economy are a
more powerful factor for shaping how partisans benchmark their economic assessments than an
individual’s level of knowledge. Third, and conversely, it could also be the case that the moder-
ating influence of political knowledge overrides any influence of signals from the local economy.
This would suggest that political knowledge is a more powerful factor for how partisans view the
national economy than the performance of the local economy. Unfortunately, the data presented
here do not allow for these explanations to be unraveled in much more detail. This study has shown
that both political knowledge and the local economic environment independently shape how par-
tisans form perceptions of the national economy, but much work remains to be done in order to
understand how knowledge and local economic performance might work together to shape how
partisans evaluate the national economy.
4.5 Conclusions
The findings presented in this chapter demonstrate that the individual- and state-level re-
lationships shown in Chapter 3 of this study also extend to the county-level. For in-partisans in
counties with rising unemployment rates, the effect of partisanship on perceptions of the national
economy become weaker. However, at the county-level net changes in unemployment rates also
exert a significant moderating effect on the relationship between out-party identities and economic
perceptions – for out-partisans in counties with declining unemployment, the results show a neg-
ative effect of partisanship on economic perceptions. While this does not reflect the mostly null
findings for out-partisans shown in Chapter 3, these effects at the county-level are still substantially
weaker for out-partisans than for in-partisans.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
This study has demonstrated that some of the variation in national economic perceptions
can be explained by the direction of an individual’s partianship, level of political knowledge, and
the local economic environment. While previous research has emphasized the influence of sub-
jective factors such as partisanship on how citizens view objective economic performance – those
identifying with the incumbent party tend to view the economy more favorably than those opposed
to the incumbent party. The findings presented here show that this influence of partisan motivated
reasoning is not constant across individuals. A recurring theme throughout the preceding anal-
yses has been that in-partisans and out-partisans weigh their political attitudes differently when
evaluating the economy.
Chapter 2 showed that partisan motivations in national economic perceptions are moderated
by levels of political knowledge, but only for in-partisans. As in-partisans become more knowl-
edgeable, they become better able to interpret facts in belief-consistent ways and counter-argue
belief-inconsistent facts. As a result we see stronger evidence of motivated reasoning among in-
partisans with the highest levels of political knowledge. Out-partisans, on the other hand, seem to
be somewhat isolated from this conditional influence of knowledge. Out-partisans with both low
and high levels of political knowledge were almost equally as likely to view the economy unfavor-
ably. These findings suggest fundamental differences in what role partisanship plays for opinion
formation. Asymmetries between in-partisans and out-partisans is a theme that has been echoed
throughout this study.
In Chapter 3 this study demonstrated that state-level economic performance moderated the
influence of partisanship on economic perceptions for individuals identifying with the incumbent
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presidential party, but not for those identifying with the opposition party. For out-partisans, the
effect of partisanship on economic perceptions remained mostly the same regardless of changes
in a given state’s economic performance. Moreover, these moderating effects were stronger when
economic performance was measured in terms of twelve-month net changes in state unemployment
rates – percent changes in per capita disposable income from the fiscal period preceding each
ANES survey year played a much weaker role. This is likely due to the fact that income levels tend
to vary across contexts with the cost of living, as well as over time with levels of inflation. The
implication is that income measures make it difficult to compare economic performance across
localities and over time, while net changes in local unemployment rates serve as a more suitable
measure of local economic performance.
In an extension of Chapter 3’s analysis, Chapter 4 demonstrated similar findings by mea-
suring local economic performance at the county-level. For in-partisans in counties with rising
unemployment, the effect of partisanship was substantially weaker than for those in counties with
declining unemployment. The reverse was true for out-partisans – those in counties with declining
unemployment displayed weaker effects of partisanship on economic perceptions than those resid-
ing in counties with rising unemployment. Chapter 4 also tested the moderating role of political
on the extent to which partisanship shapes national economic perceptions. Somewhat suprisingly,
these results showed that the conditional role of the local economy on the formation of economic
perceptions did not vary significantly across levels of political knowledge. This likely suggests
that the influence of changes in the local economic environment tend to overshadow the moderat-
ing influence of political knowledge for partisans.
These findings raise important implications not only for our understanding of how voters
form perceptions of the national economy, but how partisans form their political opinions in gen-
eral. This study has demonstrated that the cognitive processes through which citizens come to
form economic opinions vary not only with subjective characteristics of the individual, but also
with the contexts in which those individuals exist. In the past scholars have used the relationship
between political and economic attitudes to make broad claims about the quality of democracy in
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the United States. The findings presented here make it evident that such normative claims should
be made with caution, as the decision-making processes of voters vary on the with the direction
of an individual’s political attitudes as well as with the environment that surrounds the individual.
The quality of democracy and the presence of electoral accountability are never the same for any
two individuals or any two localities. Instead, scholars need to take a better account of contextual
effects when measuring public opinion and when gauging democratic performance overall.
5.1 Author’s Note
A theme that has resonated throughout this study is that through motivated reasoning, par-
tisans view the national economy in ways congruent with their political leanings – in-partisans
view the economy favorably while out-partisans view the economy unfavorably. The purpose of
this study has been to demonstrate how objective economic performance below the national-level
moderates these partisan biases in economic perceptions. It is important that readers do not in-
terpret the theoretical arguments or analytical findings of this study to imply any unidirectional
causal relationship between political and economic attitudes. My goal has not been to discredit
decades of research showing an influence of the economy on the electoral success of incumbent
political figures. Nor has my goal been to discredit arguments that American voters are either inca-
pable of or unwilling to update their political leanings based on subjective economic assessments.
Rather, the goal of this study was to highlight the infinitely complex cognitive processes through
which subjective economic perceptions are formed. Readers should not interpret the results of
the preceding analyses as an assessment of the quality of democracy in the United States, but as
evidence that such normative assessments should be made with caution. The possibility remains
that some citizens might update their political leanings based on signals from their local economic
environment. While the formation of economic perceptions prove to be tiresomely complicated,
the inevitable truth is that despite levels of knowledge, political attitudes, economic opinions, or
contextual characteristics, no two voters are alike. To make any generalizing claim about the qual-
ity of democracy in the United States is at best naive; to do so is to miss the forest for the trees.
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Table A1. Summary Statistics, 1988 American National Election Study
N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Economic perceptions 1,170 1.92 0.72 1 3
In-party strength 1,170 0.96 1.17 0 3
Out-party strength 1,170 0.93 1.16 0 3
Presidential approval 1,170 2.72 1.19 1 4
Ideology 1,170 4.36 1.38 1 7
Employment status 1,170 0.04 0.19 0 1
Female 1,170 0.52 0.50 0 1
Nonwhite 1,170 0.13 0.34 0 1
Education 1,170 4.06 1.66 1 7
Age 1,170 44.45 16.74 17 92
General knowledge 1,170 0.59 0.24 0.00 1.00
Office Recognition 1,170 0.56 0.29 0.00 1.00
Ideological knowledge 1,170 0.56 0.30 0.00 1.00
Factual knowledge 1,170 0.66 0.28 0.00 1.00
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Table A2. Summary Statistics, 2012 American National Election Study
N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Economic perceptions 4,733 2.00 0.81 1 3
In-party strength 4,733 1.16 1.27 0 3
Out-party strength 4,733 0.76 1.13 0 3
Presidential approval 4,733 2.56 1.28 1 4
Ideology 4,733 4.16 1.48 1 7
Employment status 4,733 0.07 0.26 0 1
Female 4,733 0.50 0.50 0 1
Nonwhite 4,733 0.37 0.48 0 1
Education 4,733 4.53 1.57 1 7
Age 4,733 50.25 16.51 17 90
General knowledge 4,733 0.67 0.21 0.00 1.00
Office Recognition 4,733 0.47 0.29 0.00 1.00
Ideological knowledge 4,733 0.76 0.27 0.00 1.00
Factual knowledge 4,733 0.66 0.19 0.00 1.00
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Table A3. Exploratory Factor Analysis of Political Knowledge Items, 1988 American National
Election Study
Factor Loadinga
Speaker 0.40
UK Prime Minister 0.46
Arafat 0.53
Russian Prime Minister 0.48
Secretary of State 0.51
Ted Kennedy 0.43
Party Ideology 0.63
Party Gov’t Services 0.56
Party Defense Spending 0.56
Party Healthcare 0.64
Party Job Guarantees 0.61
Party Minority Aid 0.37
Candidate Ideology 0.62
Candidate Gov’t Services 0.56
Candidate Defense Spending 0.59
Candidate Healthcare 0.58
Candidate Job Guarantees 0.63
Candidate Minority Aid 0.39
∆Unemployment 0.31
∆Inflation 0.46
∆Deficit 0.30
More Conservative Party 0.43
Senate Party 0.47
House Party 0.51
Note: Entries are unrotated principal factor loadings.
a The single retained factor explained 64% of the total variance in the latent construct.
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Table A4. Exploratory Factor Analysis of Political Knowledge Items, 2012 American National
Election Study
Factor Loadinga
Speaker of the House 0.50
Vice President 0.42
UK Prime Minister 0.40
Treasury Secretary 0.54
UN Secretary General 0.36
Party ideology 0.62
Party gov’t services 0.53
Party defense spending 0.58
Party healthcare 0.63
Party job guarantees 0.62
Candidate ideology 0.60
Candidate gov’t services 0.50
Candidate defense spending 0.59
Candidate healthcare 0.59
Candidate job guarantees 0.58
Candidate aid to minorities 0.46
Candidate environment 0.52
Current unemployment 0.38
Where to vote 0.29
Presidential terms 0.28
Senate terms 0.41
More conservative party 0.51
House election outcome 0.41
Size of deficit 0.38
What is medicare? 0.26
Federal spending 0.26
Note: Entries are unrotated principal factor loadings.
a The single retained factor explained 65% of the total variance in the latent construct.
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All of the items listed below were included on each of the ANES time-series surveys from
1980 through 2012. Exact question wordings varied slightly in some years but can be found in
the ANES cumulative codebook at http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/cdf/cdf.htm. Each
variable’s name in the codebook is listed below.
Survey Variable Codings
Retrospective Economic Perceptions (VCF0871)
“Would you say that over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten better, stayed about the
same, or gotten worse?”
“Would you say much better [worse] or somewhat better [worse]?”
1 Much worse
2 Somewhat worse
3 About the same
4 Somewhat better
5 Much better
Partisanship (VCF0301)1
“Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Indepen-
dent, or what?”
“Would you call yourself a strong Democrat [Republican] or a not very strong Democrat [Repub-
lican]?”
For Independents: “Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?”
-3 Strong out-party
-2 Weak out-party
-1 Independent leaning out-party
0 Pure independent
1 Independent leaning in-party
2 Weak in-party
3 Strong in-party
1The original coding for partisanship was a seven point scale ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican.
The measure was reverse coded for survey years in which a Democrat held the presidency and centered over zero (pure
Independents) so that positive values indicate identification with the incumbent presidential party and negative values
indicate identification with the out-party.
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In-Partisan Strength
0 Pure independent or out-partisan
1 In-partisan leaning independent
2 Weak in-partisan
3 Strong in-partisan
Out-Partisan Strength
0 Pure independent or in-partisan
1 Out-partisan leaning independent
2 Weak Out-partisan
3 Strong Out-partisan
Employment Status (VCF0116)
0 Working now; retired; permanently disabled; homemaker; student
1 Temporarily laid off; unemployed
Education (standardized in analysis) (VCF0140a)
1 8 grades or less and no diploma or equivalency
2 9-11 grades with no further schooling
3 High school diploma or equivalency test
4 More than 12 years of schooling with no higher degree
5 Junior or community college level degree
6 B.A. level degree
7 Advanced degree
Nonwhite (VCF0106a)
0 White
1 Nonwhite
Female (VCF0104)
0 Male
1 Female
Age (standardized in analysis) (VCF0101)
# of years
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Table A5. Survey Variable Means and Standard Deviations
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Observations
Retrospective evaluations 2.61 1.44 29,404
Prospective evaluations 2.04 0.76 25,838
Partisanship −0.02 2.11 29,514
In-partisan strength 0.92 1.17 29,514
Out-partisan strength 0.94 1.17 29,514
Presidential approval 2.58 1.21 28,691
Employment status 0.07 0.25 29,771
Education 3.96 1.66 29,754
Nonwhite 0.22 0.41 29,810
Female 0.55 0.50 29,689
Age 46.72 17.50 30,005
Source: 1980-2012 ANES Time-Series Surveys.
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Table A6. Sample Sizes by State, 1980-2012 American National Election Studies
State Observations
Alabama 22
Alaska 17
Arizona 389
Arkansas 472
California 3,189
Colorado 611
Connecticut 405
Delaware 68
District of Columbia 47
Florida 1,508
Georgia 1,045
Hawaii 20
Idaho 37
Illinois 958
Indiana 800
Iowa 464
Kansas 399
Kentucky 169
Louisiana 466
Maine 63
Maryland 543
Massachesetts 670
Michigan 1,423
Minnesota 774
Mississippi 161
Missouri 469
State Observations
Montana 37
Nebraska 145
Nevada 115
New Hampshire 274
New Jersey 739
New Mexico 214
New York 1,895
North Carolina 772
North Dakota 72
Ohio 1,180
Oklahoma 179
Oregon 576
Pennsylvania 984
Rhode Island 58
South Carolina 257
South Dakota 52
Tennessee 934
Texas 2,486
Utah 243
Vermont 22
Virginia 1,088
Washington 638
West Virgina 297
Wisconsin 782
Wyoming 317
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Table A7. Net Changes in State Unemployment, by Survey Year
Year Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
1980 1.55 1.01 0.30 3.80
1982 2.26 1.03 0.70 6.40
1984 −1.19 0.53 −2.20 0.00
1986 −0.12 0.95 −1.40 2.40
1988 −0.49 0.45 −1.90 0.40
1990 0.66 0.68 −0.60 2.70
1992 0.31 0.81 −1.00 2.00
1994 −0.96 0.53 −2.00 0.10
1996 −0.28 0.37 −0.90 0.70
1998 −0.23 0.31 −1.20 0.50
2000 −0.10 0.36 −0.70 1.10
2002 0.33 0.39 −0.60 1.70
2004 −0.51 0.44 −1.20 0.70
2008 2.16 0.83 0.40 3.70
2012 −0.84 0.50 −1.90 .10
Full Sample 0.01 1.22 −2.20 6.40
Notes: Unemployment data were obtained from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics
and are seasonally adjusted. Net changes indicate the 12-month change from November of the
previous year to November of each survey year.
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Table A8. Percent Changes in Per Capita Disposable Income, by Survey Year
Year Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
1980 10.21 1.58 6.15 12.94
1982 6.53 1.45 2.92 10.83
1984 10.18 1.60 6.21 14.17
1986 5.22 1.53 1.26 7.11
1988 7.56 1.83 2.79 10.89
1990 5.32 1.50 0.22 9.32
1992 5.97 1.17 3.84 7.94
1994 4.03 1.33 2.29 8.74
1996 4.18 1.00 −1.17 10.24
1998 5.65 1.29 3.25 8.90
2000 6.36 0.97 4.08 9.38
2002 3.49 1.07 1.02 6.01
2004 5.23 0.99 3.61 8.63
2008 4.18 2.66 −0.69 13.14
2012 3.13 0.81 −0.19 16.27
Full Sample 5.47 2.61 −1.17 16.27
Notes: Income data were obtained from the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Changes in per capita disposable income are measured as the percent change from the period
prior to November of each survey year.
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Figure A1. Economic Perceptions and Presidential Approval, 1980-2012
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Notes: Data were obtained through the American National Election Studies, 1980-2012 Time Series Studies. For
both economic perceptions and presidential approval, higher values indicate more positive evaluations.
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Table A9. Mixed Effects Models of Economic Perceptions and Presidential Approval
Model 3 Model 4
Retrospective Prospective
Fixed Effects β S.E. β S.E.
Approval 0.17∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.04∗∗ (0.02)
Approval*∆Unemployment −0.04c (0.01) −0.02c (0.01)
Approval*Unemployment 0.03c (0.004) 0.03c (0.00)
Approval*∆ PCDI 0.03c (0.003) 0.01c (0.00)
Approval*log(PCDI) 0.21c (0.02) 0.09c (0.01)
PID 0.04∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.003)
Employment Status −0.21∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.05∗∗∗ (0.02)
Education 0.05∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.01∗ (0.00)
Nonwhite −0.03∗ (0.02) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.02)
Female −0.15∗∗∗ (0.01) −0.05∗∗∗ (0.01)
Age −0.01∗∗∗ (0.00) −0.01∗∗∗ (0.00)
Age-squared 0.00∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.00∗∗∗ (0.00)
Intercept 2.34∗∗∗ (0.11) 1.89∗∗∗ (0.06)
Random Effects γ S.E. γ S.E.
∆ Unemployment −0.18∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.02∗∗ (0.01)
Unemployment −0.12∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
∆ PCDI −0.08∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
log(PCDI) −0.66∗∗∗ (0.08) 0.03 (0.03)
σApproval 0.04∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.007)
σIntercept 0.14∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.03∗∗∗ (0.01)
Cov(σApproval , σIntercept) −0.79∗∗∗ (0.15) 1.00∗∗∗ (3.6e−6)
Observations 27,119 24,049
Groups 51 51
Wald Chi2 6,536.67∗∗∗ 1,191.99∗∗∗
Note: Entries indicate maximum likelihood estimates with an unrestricted covariance structure; robust tandard errors
are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable in Model 3 is a five-point measure of retrospective economic
evaluations ranging from “much worse” to “much better”; the dependent variable in Model 4 is a three-point measure
of prospective economic evaluations ranging from “worse” to “better.”
∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001
c Conditional relationship – see marginal effects for statistical significance
134
VITA
Bradley T. Dickerson 901-262-6957 btdicker@go.olemiss.edu
136 Deupree Hall, Department of Political Science, University of Mississippi
EDUCATION
• University of Mississippi
Ph.D., Political Science, May 2016
Dissertation: “Motivated Reasoning, Ambivalence, and the Local Economy: Asymmetric
Biases in the Formation of Economic Perceptions”
Committee: Heather Ondercin (co-chair); Chuck Smith (co-chair); Mike Henderson; Jody
Holland
• ICPSR Summer Program in Quantitative Methods of Social Research
EITM Certification, Summer 2015
Regression Analysis II: Linear Models
Applied Multilevel Modeling
• Mississippi State University
M.A., Political Science, August 2011
B.A., Political Science & Public Administration, May 2008
Thesis: “Measuring the Salience of the Economy: The Effects of Economic Conditions on
Voter Perceptions and Turnout in Mississippi”
Committee: Mary McThomas (chair); Rob Mellen, Jr.; Steve Shaffer
RESEARCH INTERESTS
• Public opinion, political psychology, voting behavior, and campaign spending
TEACHING INTERESTS
• Public opinion, political behavior, campaigns and elections, political parties, U.S. political
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• “Economic Perceptions, Presidential Approval, and Causality: The Moderating Role of the
Economic context.” American Politics Research. Forthcoming.
135
UNDER REVIEW
• “Conditional Motivated Reasoning: How the Local Economy Moderates Partisan Motiva-
tions in Economic Perceptions.” Political Research Quarterly. Revise and resubmit.
• “Partisanship and the Asymmetrical Effects of Knowledge on National Economic Evalua-
tions.” Public Opinion Quarterly.
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• “National Economic Evaluations in Context: The Influence of Local Economic Conditions.”
With Bryan Dettrey and Harvey Palmer.
• “The Perfect Storm: Citizens United, the Obama Index, and the 2010 U.S. House Elections.”
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• “Political Knowledge, Economic Conditions, and Partisan Motivations in the Formation of
Economic Perceptions.”
• “Voter Turnout, Unemployment, and Electoral Competition in U.S. Presidential Elections,
2000-2012.”
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Dissertation Fellowship Award, University of Mississippi, Spring 2016, $6,500
Warren E. Miller Fellowship, 2015 ICPSR Summer Program, $4,000
Prestage-Cook Travel Award, 2013 Southern Political Science Association, $250
Best Graduate Paper Award, 2012 Mississippi Political Science Association, $50
• Departmental Travel Grants
University of Mississippi, 2015 American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA
University of Mississippi, 2015 Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL
University of Mississippi, 2014 Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL
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University of Mississippi, 2014 Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA
University of Mississippi, 2013 Southern Political Science Association, Orlando, FL
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS
• “Partisan Biases in Economic Perceptions: The Influence of the Local Economy.” Presented
at the 2015 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco,
CA.
• “Political Ambivalence in Economic Voting: The Moderating Role of State-Level Economic
Conditions for the Formation of Economic Perceptions.” Presented at the 2015 annual meet-
ing of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
• “Economic Perceptions, Presidential Approval, and Causality: The Moderating Role of the
Economic Context.” Presented at the 2014 annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science
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• “Partisan Biases in Economic Perceptions: Political Knowledge and the Economic Context.”
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LA.
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• “Measuring the Salience of the Economy: The Effects of Economic Conditions on Voter
Perceptions and Turnout in Mississippi.” Presented at the 2011 annual meeting of the Mis-
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• “Economic Perceptions Shape Attitudes toward the President during Times of Economic
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TECHNICAL SKILLS
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